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INTRODUCTION
David left here at 8:30 one night to go over to his fiancee's house. He was
down on Northern Parkway going eastbound and a truck coming westbound
hit a bump in the road, crossed the median strip, and hit him head on. We
didn't get a call until 11:00 that night and they told us that he was in the
Emergency Room and he was hurt pretty badly. So we went down and I
couldn't believe my eyes. I couldn't believe that that was the son that I'd seen
just a few hours ago. He was covered with bandages. He was obviously in a
coma. Blood and broken bones... it was pretty awful. We were taken into a
room where the doctors came in. We were told that they would tell us what his
condition was and we sat down, Lin and I (Lin was David's fiancee), and my
other son Michael. The doctor said your son is in a coma and we don't expect
him to live. If he does live he probably will never regain consciousness. There
wasn't much else to say. That was his condition. He had broken bones....
He had a ruptured spleen. A lot of those things they could take care of But
they couldn't fix the ultimate damage which was the brain damage ... the
persistent vegetative state.... If we brought him home and he got pneumonia
he would die. But the medical profession could keep him living for 20 or 30
years.
So this was the dilemma we were faced with and I said to Dr. Richardson
if you agree with the diagnosis of persistent vegetative state-take as long as
you want to observe him-but if you agree I would like to have the tubes re-
moved, have the life support systems taken away. And he agreed to that. So
after afew months of observing him and we did too, everyone did, there was no
change. There was not even a slight improvement. There was no improve-
ment. And he agreed and he said "I agree with you but you are going to have
to go to court to do this." I said "Court!" That was brand new to me and
nobody had said anything about laws about this and I said "why?" and he
said "Because you don't have the power to do anything. You don't have his
power of attorney, he hasn't left any directives and you can't make this decision
for him because he is over 21."
You know that for all that we had been through with the accident, the
initial reaction to the accident, and then all the hope that something good was
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going to happen, and the receding hope-well he's never going to be the same
but maybe he'll walk, but maybe he'll talk, but maybe he's not going to do
anything. All of that emotional trauma and then to finally have to make a
decision David was going to die. He had to die. And then to have to deal with
people who said you don't have the right to make that decision. I can't tell you
the effect that it had on the family. It made us all so angy that here we had
come to this place, David had come to this place. All the people who were in the
know agreed and then there were these other rules and regulations that we had
to meet that didn't seem to have any bearing on anything but legalese.
Nicci Bojanowski'
On May 12, 1993, Maryland Governor William Donald Schaefer
signed into law the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act. 2 The law,
which went into effect on October 1, 1993, covers advance directives
and medical decisionmaking, including termination of life support,
for individuals who lack decisionmaking capacity. It significantly
changes the way cases similar to that of David Bojanowski are resolved.
The relatively swift passage of the law came as a surprise to many,
including those who worked on the legislation. Views on the issue of
withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (LST) run
deep and are strongly held by individuals in our society. For many it is
an issue of personal liberty not to be infringed by the state or health
care providers. For others, it is an issue of the sacredness of human
life, a sacredness that should be protected by the state, not whittled
away by judgments of family or medical staff that a certain quality of
life is not worth supporting.
Although many of the issues addressed in the legislation have
been litigated in state courts where the views of individual parties have
been pitted against one another, the passage of legislation offers an
opportunity for all citizens of a state to express their views on these
important questions and ultimately involves politics-the power of
various constituencies to parlay their views into legislative enactments
or to negotiate with each other in an effort to reach a compromise.
Voices that may not be heard in individual cases decided in the courts
may have significant influence in the state legislature.
At this time, all but three states (Massachusetts, Michigan and
New York) have legislation on living wills and all but one state (Ala-
1. THE HEALTH CARE DECISIONS AcT (Maryland Public Television 1993). David Boja-
nowski was 26 years old when he was involved in the tragic car accident. After a year in a
persistent vegetative state, ajudge allowed his feeding tubes to be removed, and he died in
October 1991. See Mary Knudson, A Matter of L!fe and Death, BALT. SUN, Mar. 8, 1992, at 1A.
2. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5.601 to .618 (1994).
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bama) on durable powers of attorney for health care or appointment
of a proxy for health care decisionmaking 5 In addition, most states
now have legislation allowing family members to make medical treat-
ment decisions for patients who lack decisionmaking capacity.4 In
some states, this legislation has sailed through the legislature with lit-
tle difficulty, while in others, it has engendered considerable legisla-
tive battles, some lasting for years.5 In many states, different views on
the issues have resulted in accommodation of positions of various con-
stituencies. For example, although appellate courts that have consid-
ered the issue have not placed any more stringent conditions on the
withdrawal or withholding of feeding tubes than on other forms of
medical treatment, advance directive statutes in several states have.6
This treatment of artificial sustenance is also at odds with the leading
3. STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION-MAKING IN LIFE-
SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES 209-21 (1993) (hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR STATE
COURTS); CHOICE IN DYING, INC., REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION: A STATE BY STATE
COMPILATION OF ENACTED AND MODEL STATUTES (1992).
4. As ofJanuary 1, 1994, 34 states had such legislation. Charles P. Sabatino, New State
Health Care Decisions Legislation: 1993 Annual Summary, ABA Comm. on Legal Problems of
the Elderly (1994) (hereinafter New Health Care Decisions Legislation).
5. For example, in New Jersey, the state legislature debated passage of a living will
statute for 17 years prior to its ultimate enactment. Telephone Conversation with Robert
S. Olick, former Executive Director of the New Jersey Comm'n on Legal & Ethical
Problems in the Delivery of Health Care (Aug. 17, 1993).
6. Until recently, several state living will statutes required the provision of nutrition
and hydration except in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/2-2(d) (Smith-Hurd 1992); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolong-
ing Procedures Act, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-364-1 (Burns 1993); Kentucky Living Will Act, Ky.
REv. STAT. § 311.624(5) (b) (Baldwin Supp. 1991); Missouri Life-Support Declarations Act,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon 1992); New Hampshire Living Wills Act, N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2(II) (Supp. 1992); North Dakota Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-06.1 (Supp. 1993); Oklahoma Rights of the Terminally Ill or
Persistently Unconscious Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.3(6) (West Supp. 1994).
During the past year, a number of these states, e.g., Indiana and Kentucky, have relaxed
their statutes to allow individuals to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration through their
living wills. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-364-1 (Burns Supp. 1994); 1994 Ky. REv. STAT. & R. SERV.
235 (Baldwin). In Maryland, prior to the enactment of the Health Care Decisions Act of
1993, the Life Sustaining Treatment Act required that persons be permitted to die natu-
rally if terminally ill, "with only the administration of medication, the administration of
food and water, and the performance of any medical procedure that is necessary to pro-
vide comfort care or alleviate pain." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(c) (1990). A
1988 Opinion by the Maryland Attorney General, however, stated that such a provision was
probably unconstitutional and that citizens could modify the statutory form to reflect their
wishes not to receive artificially administered nutrition and hydration. 73 Op. Att'y Gen.
162 (1988). A number of state durable power of attorney for health care acts have also
restricted the withdrawal or withholding of artificial nutrition or hydration unless specified
conditions are met. See, e.g., Missouri Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 404.820(2),(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993); Nebraska Power of Attorney for Health
Care Act, NEB. RV. STAT. §§ 30-3418(2) (Supp. 1992); New York Health Care Proxy Act,
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2982(2) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1993); South Dakota Durable Power
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medical-ethical authorities in the country as well as with various pro-
fessional societies," yet reflects the views of a number of religious
groups and right to life organizations.
State law also places limitations on family decisionmaking author-
ity. In a number of states there are no statutes authorizing family
members to make medical treatment decisions on behalf of an inca-
pacitated relative. In others, family members have authority to con-
sent to medical treatment generally but no explicit authority to refuse
life-sustaining treatment.' In other states, statutes limit family deci-
sionmaking to terminate life support to cases where the patient is ter-
minally ill.' Again, this restriction is in contrast to much of the case
law that has permitted families to consent to the withholding or with-
drawal of life support when patients are in a persistent vegetative state
or have some other disease not considered terminal.1t As in the case
of advance directive legislation, in some states family members may
not make a decision to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and
hydration.'1 As a result, it seems that on the whole, state legislation in
the area of termination of life support has been more "conservative"
than court decisions covering the same issues.
This Article uses the recent experience in Maryland with the pas-
sage of the Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 to explore the issue of
accommodation in state legislation on advance directives and surro-
gate decisionmaking for incapacitated individuals and the policy and
practical implications of the ultimate legislation passed. The Mary-
land "story" provides an excellent medium for this examination as it
involved two competing pieces of legislation representing two seem-
ingly different schools of thought or philosophies about (1) the role
of Attorney Act, S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 59-7-2.7 (1993); Wisconsin Power of Attorney
for Health Care Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.20(4) (West Supp. 1993).
7. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE-PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT (1989, 1986);
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF NEUROLOGY, POSITION OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF NEUROLOGY ON
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CARE AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE PA-
TIENT (1988); AMERICAN GERIATRICS SOCIETY, AGS POSITION STATEMENT: MEDICAL TREAT-
MENT DECISIONS CONCERNING ELDERLY PERSONS (1987); UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ELDERLY (1987).
8. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4303 (1985). See also New
Health Care Decisions Legislation, supra note 4, at 13.
9. See, e.g., Judith Areen, Advance Directives Under State Law and Judicial Decisions, 19
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 91, 98 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.305 (West Supp. 1992);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West Supp. 1992).
10. See, e.g., Areen, supra note 9, at 97; In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (11.
1989); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In reTorres,
357 N.E.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
11. Areen, supra note 9, at 98-99.
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of the state and the state's interests in these cases; (2) the basic pur-
pose of the legislation; (3) the role of courts vis-a-vis other deci-
sionmakers; and (4) the role of law generally in such issues. Both bills
were subject to significant public scrutiny and debate and provide a
rich history for examination and analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
In February 1993, two comprehensive bills on health care deci-
sionmaking were introduced into the Maryland Senate. 12 Senate Bill
676 (SB 676), introduced by SenatorJohn Pica, was drafted by a com-
mittee chaired by Judge John Carroll Byrnes (Circuit Court of Balti-
more City) and composed of representatives from the Office of the
Attorney General, the Health Law Section of the Maryland State Bar,
the Maryland Disability Law Center and the University of Maryland
School of Medicine (hereinafter the "committee proposal"). The
committee was established in March 1992 and functioned under the
auspices of the Conference of Circuit Judges."5 Senate Bill 664 (SB
664), introduced by Senators Paula Hollinger, Mary Boergers and
Vernon Boozer, was modeled after the Virginia Health Care Decisions
Act 4 and was put forward by a coalition of consumer and provider
group representatives' 5 (hereinafter the "coalition proposal").
The drafters of the coalition proposal responded to drafts of the
committee proposal that they felt to be too restrictive of individual
and surrogate decisionmaking. Those who worked on the committee
bill argued that the coalition bill was too expansive, not providing suf-
ficient protections for incapacitated patients. Although both bills cov-
ered virtually the same territory-advance directives and surrogate
12. Subsequently, identical legislation was introduced into the Maryland House of Del-
egates. The companion bill to SB 676 was HB 1243, introduced by Delegate Sheila Hixson.
Minor amendments were made to SB 664 in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee
and it was introduced into the House as HB 1432 by Delegate Leonard Teitelbaum.
13. REPORT OF THE BILL DRAFTING COMMITEE TO THE MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
THE HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING Acr OF 1993, S.B. 676 [hereinafter REPORT OF THE BILL
DRAFTING COMM.].
14. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie Supp. 1993).
15. The group included representatives from the University of Maryland School of
Law, the Maryland Chapter of the AARP, the United Seniors of Maryland, the Medical and
Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland (the state medical association), the Maryland Hospital As-
sociation, the Alzheimer's Association (Maryland Chapter), the Maryland Legal Aid Bu-
reau, Health Care For All, Emergency Medicine Physicians (Maryland Chapter), Medical
Diiectors of Long Term Care Facilities (Maryland Chapter), Maryland Bar Sections on
Estates and Trusts and Delivery of Legal Services, National Association of Elderlaw Attor-
neys (Maryland Chapter), and the Women's Law Center.
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decisionmaking, physician responsibilities, and guardianship-they
took considerably different approaches to the issues.
II. SENATE BILL 676 AND ITS PREcuRsoRs
The intent of the drafters of the committee proposal was to pro-
duce a comprehensive piece of legislation covering (1) individual
decisionmaking by a competent person; (2) decisionmaking by judges
under Maryland guardianship law; (3) durable powers of attorney for
health care; (4) living wills; (5) surrogate/family decisionmaking; and
(6) emergency treatment and other decisions by physicians. 16 The
committee articulated the need for a comprehensive approach in its
report to the legislature, which stated:
There is virtually unanimous opinion that these areas of the
law should not be legislated separately. Although separate
legislation might permit shorter bills, it could result in six
different sets of standards and serve no one's interest, partic-
ularly doctors, patients, and the families of patients. The
public interest is better served by uniform standards that re-
spect and balance both personal health care autonomy and
life preservation. To achieve uniform standards, the General
Assembly of Maryland must enact a comprehensive law.
1 7
Consistent with this goal, the committee produced a series of
comprehensive draft bills that covered each of these areas.18 The pro-
posals provided that a competent individual had a right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, unless the individual was the sole pro-
vider of a minor child and the life-sustaining treatment would allow
her to continue to provide for the care of the child or children. In
these cases, the individual was required to seek court approval before
refusing life support.19 With regard to advance directives, the propos-
16. REPORT OF THE BILL DRAFTING COMM., supra note 13, at 6.
17. Id.
18. The drafting committee circulated three draft proposals for public comment. The
dates of these drafts were April 30, 1992, October 5, 1992, and December 13, 1992.
19. The proposals provided that an individual could not decline or discontinue a life-
sustaining procedure without court approval if
(A) The principal was: (1) The sole natural or appointed guardian of a mi-
nor child; and (2) immediately prior to the onset of the medical condition cur-
rently affecting the individual, the individual was providing for the child's
support, care, nurture, welfare, and education; and (3) the provision of health
care would afford the individual a reasonable expectation of recovery.
April 30, 1992 Draft, §§ 5-710, 5-719. Recovery was defined as "to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, the individual would regain the capacity that the individual had, prior to
the onset of the medical condition currently affecting the individual, to providd for the
child's support, care, nurture, welfare, and education." April 30, 1992, §§ 5-710, 5-719; see
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als kept much of the existing legislation on living wills intact; however,
the drafters revised the statutory living will form to allow individuals to
choose whether they wanted to treat artificial nutrition and hydration
differently than other forms of life-sustaining treatment.20 In addi-
tion, the proposals permitted a living will to take effect not only when
a patient was terminally ill,21 but also when a patient was permanently
unconscious.
22
The proposals also established a statutory foundation for durable
powers of attorney for health care23 with standards regarding who
could serve as an agent, the formalities of execution for these docu-
ments, and standards for decisionmaking by a health care agent.24
This had been lacking in Maryland. The proposals did not include a
model statutory form, but rather provided that the Attorney General,
in consultation with a number of interested parties, would prepare
and disseminate a model durable power of attorney for health care
decisions form.25 Finally, in the area of advance directives, the pro-
posals codified a provision in an earlier Attorney General's Opinion,
permitting competent individuals to make an oral advance directive
by talking directly to their physician about their desires for life-sus-
taining treatment.2
In cases in which a patient did not appoint an agent, the propos-
als expressly gave family members the authority to make medical deci-
also October 5, 1992 Draft, §§ 20A-507, 20A-701; December 13, 1992 Draft, §§ 20A-701 to -
702. The limitation did not consider the burdensome nature of the treatment proposed or
make exception for individuals such as Jehovah's Witnesses with religious objections to
certain types of life-sustaining treatments.
20. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-602(c); October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-402(c); December
13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-401 (c).
21. The then-existing living will statute limited the application of the living will to those
cases in which two physicians certified that a patient had a terminal condition. MD. CODE
ANN., H.ALTH-GEN. § 5-602(c) (1990).
22. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-602(c); October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-402(c); December
13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-401(c).
23. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-711; October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-501; December 13, 1992
Draft, § 20A-501.
24. April 30, 1992 Draft, §§ 5-711 to -716; October 5, 1992 Draft, §§ 20A-501 to -506;
December 13, 1992 Draft, §§ 20A-501 to -509. The decisionmaking standards included
substituted judgment or, if this was an insufficient basis for an agent to make a decision,
the best interests of the patient, unless the patient was in a persistent vegetative state. April
30, 1992 Draft, § 5-727; October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-504; December 13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-
505.
25. SB 676, § 13-713.
26. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. at 185. The oral directive was valid as long as the patient's ex-
pressed wishes were entered into the patient's medical record by his physician. April 30,
1992 Draft, § 5-705; October 5, 1992 Draft, §§ 20A-203(1), 20A-303; December 13, 1992
Draft, § 20A-301.
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sions for incapacitated patients, including the authority to withhold
life-sustaining treatment from patients under certain circumstances.
Prior to the new legislation, an Attorney General's Opinion provided
that family members could consent to the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment from an incapacitated patient, but only if
the patient was terminally ill.28 This was the state of the law when
Nicci Bojanowski attempted to have her son, David, taken off of life
support. The proposed legislation codified the authority of certain
family members to make this decision and expanded the family's au-
thority to act to include cases in which the patient was permanently
unconscious. The committee proposal established an order of prior-
ity of surrogate decisionmakers29 consistent with the hierarchy set
forth in the then existing substituted consent law,3° "with the addition
of persons who [were] not blood relatives but who, by virtue of their
relationship and concern for the patient, [would be] reliable surro-
gates."3 The proposals also provided that surrogates and agents were
to make a decision on behalf of an incapacitated patient using a sub-
stituted judgment standard or, if unable to arrive at a decision using
that standard, with a best interest test.32 However, as with an agent, a
27. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-726; October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-601; December 13, 1992
Draft, § 20A-601.
28. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. at 196-99. The Opinion stated that a close family member may
decide to withdraw or withhold artificial nutrition or hydration without court proceedings
if.
(i) The person is disabled and terminally ill;
(ii) The attending physicians agree that foregoing treatment is medically
proper;
(iii) The family member determines that foregoing treatment is what the
disabled person would want done or, if that is unknown, is in the person's best
interest;
(iv) No other family member disagrees with the decision; and
(v) When applicable, the hospital's patient care advisory committee has not
advised against foregoing treatment.
Id. at 199.
29. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-726(A); October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-601 (C); December
13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-601 (C).
30. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-107(d) (1990 & Supp. 1992) ("In the absence of
a durable power of attorney that relates to medical care... any of the following individuals
may give a substituted consent to medical care,... (i) A spouse ... ; (ii) An adult child
... ; (iii) A parent ... ; (iv) An adult sibling... ; (v) A grandparent ... ; (vi) An adult
grandchild... ; (vii) An adult aunt or uncle... ; (viii) An adult niece or nephew...; (ix)
An adult cousin,").
31. REPORT OF THE Bxu. DRAFTING COMM., supra note 13, at 20.
32. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-727(A) (4); October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-604(B); Decem-
ber 13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-602.
1072 [VOL. 53:1064
1994] SYmposiuM: TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONMAKING 1073
surrogate could not use a best interest test to withhold or withdraw life
support from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. s
The proposals also provided standards for judges in guardianship
cases or cases involving the termination or withholding of life support.
For competent patients with minor children, the judge was to con-
sider the needs of the child for the continued care of the parent.34 If
the life-sustaining treatment could restore the parent to a condition
where he or she could care for the child, the judge could decide not
to grant the competent person's request not to receive life- sustaining
treatment.35 Judges could only grant a request to withhold or with-
draw life support if there was clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's wishes or clear and convincing evidence that such action
would be in the patient's best interest.36 As was the case for an agent
and surrogate, a judge could not grant a request to withhold life sup-
port from a patient in a persistent vegetative state on the basis of a
best interest test.3 7
Finally, the proposals provided that a physician need not offer a
patient medical treatment that the physician considered "medically fu-
tile,"3M nor obtain consent for failure to provide such treatment.39
33. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-727; October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-604(C); December 13,
1992 Draft, § 20A-602(C) (2).
34. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 13-715; October 5, 1992 Draft, § 13-715; December 13, 1992
Draft, § 13-715.
35. Id.
36. April 30, 1993 Draft, §§ 13-712 to -713; October 5, 1992 Draft, §§ 13-712 to -713;
December 13, 1992 Draft, §§ 13-712 to -713.
37. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 13-713; October 5, 1992 Draft, § 13-713; December 13, 1992
Draft, § 13-713.
38. A definition of medically futile was provided in the drafts. The April 30, 1992
Draft, § 5-703(M) defined medically futile to mean: "(1) To a reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty, not expected to achieve a clinically significant beneficial effect on a medical
condition; or (2) prolonging a dying process in its final stage under circumstances that
would make treatment inconsistent with generally accepted medical standards and stan-
dards of ethical practice." The definition was altered in the October 5, 1992 Draft as
follows:
"Medically futile" means that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, a
medical treatment or procedure will not: (1) Prevent or postpone for more than
an insignificant length of time the death of the individual; (2) Improve or main-
tain the health of an individual; or (3) Prevent or reduce the deterioration of the
health of an individual.
October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-101(R).
The definition remained the same in the December 13, 1992 Draft, though the term
"medically futile" was changed to "medically ineffective." December 13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-
101(R).
39. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-704; October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-205; December 13, 1992
Draft, § 20A-204.
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Although the committee proposal underwent a significant evolu-
tion from its initial conception to its final form, as introduced, the bill
remained significantly more restrictive than its rival, SB 664. The pri-
mary criticisms of the committee proposals were their (1) extensive
reference to "state interests," including the state's interest in the pres-
ervation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of innocent
third parties and the preservation of the ethical integrity of the medi-
cal profession; (2) distinct treatment of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion from other types of life-sustaining treatment; (3) numerous
restrictions on agent and family decisionmaking; (4) restrictive ap-
proach to termination of life support for patients in a persistent vege-
tative state; and (5) length, detail, and complexity.
A. State Interests
The committee proposals placed significant emphasis on the con-
cept of state interests. The earliest draft (April 30, 1992) included the
following section, entitled "Legislative Findings":
The General Assembly finds and declares that:
(a) The state on behalf of all of its citizens has an inter-
est in the preservation of the life of each of its citizens.
(b) The state on behalf of all of its citizens has an inter-
est in preventing individuals from committing suicide and in
preventing others from assisting an individual to commit
suicide.
(c) The state on behalf of all of its citizens has an inter-
est in ensuring, to the extent possible, that the welfare of
minor children not be seriously impaired as a result of a de-
cision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures.
(d) (1) The state on behalf of all of its citizens has an
interest in preserving the ethical and professional integrity of
the health care professions.
(2) A health care provider should always act in ac-
cordance with the provider's ethical precepts and may not be
required to act in violation of those precepts.4 °
A subsequent draft, dated October 5, 1992, included almost identical
language41 and added the following preamble:
40. April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-701.
41. The Legislative Findings Section of the October 5th draft stated:
The General Assembly finds that:
(a) The state, on behalf of all of its people, has an interest in the preservation
of life.
(b) The state, on behalf of all of its people, has an interest in the prevention
of suicide and assisted suicide.
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WHEREAS, the constitutional law of this nation recog-
nizes an individual's right to both personal health care deci-
sionmaking, complementing the common law doctrine of
informed consent, and the preservation of life, and
WHEREAS, the people of Maryland have a constitu-
tional liberty interest in making personal health care deci-
sions; and
WHEREAS, the State of Maryland on behalf of all of its people,
has an interest in assuring that legislation to safeguard personal
health care decisionmaking also reflects our societal concern for lfe
preservation, for the needs of minor dependents who may be affected
by a health care decision, and for the professional and ethical integ-
rity of the health care community; and
WHEREAS, the State is constitutionally permitted to en-
act reasonable safeguards to protect the integrity of individ-
ual health care decisions, to protect the vulnerable and the
dependent, including some people with disabilities and
some elderly people, and to assure that health care decisions
made by a surrogate on behalf of an incapacitated patient
are in keeping with the wishes of the patient or are in the
best interest of the patient; and
WHEREAS, the balance struck by this law furthers the
preeminent societal value that the life of every individual has worth
in and of itself and is not to be devalued by reason of an individ-
ual's incapacity or perceived diminished "quality of life," whether
because of emotional, mental, or physical disability or be-
cause of advanced age or economic disadvantage; and
WHEREAS, this law is intended to provide standards for
decisionmaking about life-sustaining procedures but not to
suggest what the decision of any individual should be; and
WHEREAS, it is the intent of the General Assembly that
this law advance the interests and wishes of the individuals
whose life and health may be affected by its provisions, not
the interests and wishes of others, including those who are
granted authority under this law to act on behalf of an
individual;4"
A subsequent draft, on December 13, 1992, preserved the Preamble
virtually intact, but revised the Legislative Findings section and called
(c) The state, on behalf of all of its people, has an interest in ensuring, to the
extent possible, that ... a decision to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining proce-
dure not seriously impair the welfare of minor children.
(d) The state, on behalf of all of its people, has an interest in the ethical and
professional integrity of the health care professions.
October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-102.
42. October 5, 1992 Draft at 4-5 (emphasis added).
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it a "Statement of Legislative Policy."4" While the draft preserved the
listing of the "four state interests," in an effort to gain public accept-
ance, the drafters added an initial statement recognizing the rights of
individuals to make health care decisions and the appropriateness of
family decisionmaking for incapacitated patients.44 The final commit-
tee proposal eliminated the Legislative Policy section but maintained
the Preamble. In a final report to the General Assembly the drafters
of the committee proposal included the following explanation for this
ultimate compromise:
Some persons believe, particularly when the health care deci-
sion concerns life itself, that the "state interests" should have
the strongest influence, while others believe the "state inter-
ests" should be weak or have no influence. Our compromise
proposes that these four oft-cited common law "state inter-
ests" be stated on behalf of the people and rather than use
[sic] them as governing standards, implement them in spe-
cific ways within the text of the bill itself.45
Thus, the recognition of these state interests was used to support spe-
cific provisions in the proposed legislation, in particular the provision
placing obstacles in the way of a competent person's refusal of life-
sustaining treatment if the individual had minor children.46 The fo-
cus on state interests also bolstered the proposals' numerous restric-
tions on the use of a living will to effectuate termination of life
support as well as decisionmaking by both agents and surrogates.
As ultimately introduced by Senator Pica, the committee propos-
als did not include the restriction on competent adults with minor
children and included a somewhat modified version of the Preamble.
Deleted from earlier drafts of the proposal was the reference to a com-
43. December 13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-102.
44. Id. ("The general intent of this title is to further the constitutional and common
law rights of individuals to self-determination about health care decisions and to foster
family-based decisionmaking when an individual is not capable of exercising those rights
independently."). This was followed by reference to the four state interests:
(B) The intent of certain provisions of this title is the specific application of
the interest of the state, on behalf of all of its people, in:
(1) The preservation of life;
(2) The prevention of suicide and assisted suicide;
(3) The safeguarding, to the extent reasonably possible, of minor children
against the serious impairment of their welfare that might result from a decision
to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining procedure; and
(4) The ethical and professional integrity of the health care professions.
Id.
45. REPORT OF THE BiL DRArING COMM., supra note 13, at 7.
46. See supra note 19.
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mon law doctrine of "preservation of life" as well as the following
provision:
WHEREAS, the State of Maryland on behalf of all of its
people, has an interest in assuring that legislation to safe-
guard personal health care decisionmaking also reflects our
societal concern for life preservation, for the needs of minor
dependents who may be affected by a health care decision,
and for the professional and ethical integrity of the health
care community. 47
B. Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
While SB 676, as ultimately introduced, did not distinguish be-
tween artificial nutrition and hydration and other forms of life-sus-
taining treatment, all of the committee proposals made this
distinction. Early drafts required agents and surrogates to provide ex-
plicit evidence of an individual's wishes to refuse artificial nutrition
and hydration as distinct from life support more generally.4" A subse-
47. October 5, 1992 Draft at 4-5.
48. The specific language in the proposals is set forth below:
(a) A health care provider may carry out the instruction of a health care
agent to withhold or withdraw a conduit, such as a tube or intravenous line, that
supplies food or water to the principal only if:
(1) The power of attorney for health care decisions expressly authorizes
the health care agent to make decisions concerning the withholding or with-
drawal of a conduit that supplies food or water to the principal;
(2) The instruction of the health care agent carries out a specific inten-
tion of the principal with respect to a conduit that supplies food and water, as
expressed in:
(i) The power of attorney for health care decisions or other ad-
vance directive; or
(ii) Any writing by the principal reviewed by the health care
provider.
April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-718; see also October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-605.
With respect to surrogate decisionmaking, the proposals stated:
A health care provider may carry out the instruction of a surrogate decision-
maker to withhold or withdraw a conduit, such as a tube or intravenous line, that
supplies food or water to the principal only if-
(a) The instruction of the surrogate decisionmaker carries out a specific in-
tention of the individual with respect to a conduit that supplies food and water, as
expressed in:
(i) Any writing reviewed by the health care provider; or
(ii) Any form of communication to the individual's attending phy-
sician recorded in the individual's medical records. ...
April 30, 1992 Draft, § 5-730.
Legislation in a small number of other states includes a similar requirement. For ex-
ample, Maine, Minnesota, and New York allow an agent to withdraw artificial nutrition and
hydration only if such authority has been expressly delegated by the patient. See ME. REv.
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quent draft modified this stringent standard somewhat by requiring
that a health care agent or surrogate determine prior to instructing
the withholding or withdrawal of a feeding tube that the instruction:
(1) Reflects the specific intent of the principal regard-
ing feeding tubes as expressed in an advance medical
directive;49
(2) Reflects a medically informed substituted judge-
ment regarding feeding tubes; or
(3) [Is] in the best interest of the principal.5 °
This draft also required that the health care provider certify in writing
the basis of the agent's or surrogate's decision.51
C. Restrictions on Effectiveness of Living Wills and on Powers of Agents
and Surrogate Decisionmakers
The committee proposals included numerous restrictions on the
effectiveness of various mechanisms through which decisions regard-
ing life-sustaining treatment could be made for an incapacitated pa-
tient.52 For example, the proposals maintained many of the restrictive
elements of the then existing living will law. These included a single
STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 5-501 to -506 (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. §§ 145C.01-.15 (Supp.
1993); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2980-94 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
49. This provision applied only to agents. Compare December 13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-
508(A) with December 13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-604(A).
50. See December 13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-508(A). If a patient was in a persistent vegeta-
tive state, a physician could not certify that withholding or withdrawal of the artificial nutri-
tion and hydration was in the patient's best interest. See December 13, 1992 Draft, §§ 20A-
508(B), -604(B).
51. See December 13, 1992 Draft, §§ 20A-508(C), -604(C). This provision was deleted
upon introduction of the bill in the Senate.
52. In his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee on the proposed legislation
relating to health care decisions (the committee proposal), dated December 18, 1992, Ron
Landsman, an elder law attorney in private practice, speaking on behalf of the active Mary-
land members of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, described the committee
proposal as follows:
The proposal of the committee chaired byJudge Byrnes would deny the right
to make advance medical decisions to most citizens of Maryland at some time in
their life-people who lose capacity by reason of stroke, heart attack, senile de-
mentia, or any of its many causes.
The committee proposal would provide a State-mandated straightjacket
"health care declaration" limiting in State-prescribed words the decisions we as
citizens would be permitted to make for our future health care.
The advisory committee proposal would effectively destroy the widespread
use of health care powers of attorney by limiting in the most crucial and sensitive
areas the powers that could be granted to agents.
The advisory committee proposal would deny family members the right to
make many important medical decisions-no matter how careful, thoughtful,
conscientious, and loving they might be-for an ill or dying loved one.
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mandatory form for health care instructions,53 a provision requiring
that a health care practitioner provide medication for relief of pain or
discomfort despite the wishes of the patient (prior to incompe-
tence),5 4 her agent, or surrogate,5 5 and a limitation on the use of the
document to cases in which the patient had a terminal condition or a
condition of permanent unconsciousness. 56
The final draft included some minor burdens on the health care
agent. For example, a health care agent was required to tell the pa-
tient's health care provider whether his or her decision was based on:
(1) the explicit instructions of the patient; (2) a substituted judgment;
or (3) the patient's best interest. The health care provider was then
required to certify the basis of the agent's decision in writing.5"
In the area of surrogate decisionmaking, the proposal limited a
surrogate's ability to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-
Such restrictive legislation is not necessary. Many other states have devel-
oped comprehensive, appropriate legislation for good medical decision-making.
Testimony of Ron Landsman, National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, before Senate
Judicial Proceeding Comm. 1 (Dec. 18, 1992).
53. The statutory language stated that "[a] Living Will shall be substantially in the fol-
lowing form: . . ." SB 676, § 20A-406(A).
54. Some patients may not want pain medication as it may render them groggy and
unable to understand what is going on around them. In other cases it may shorten or
prolong a dying process.
55. SB 676, § 20A-205.
56. Id. § 20A-405. Virtually all living will statutes include similar restrictive provisions.
See NoRMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DiREcrivsS AND THE PuRsurr OF DEATH WrTH DIGNrIy 34
(Ind. Univ. Press 1993). Until recently, most living will statutes actually confined removal
of life-sustaining treatment to cases where a patient is in a "terminal condition." Id. at 35.
Several still do. Although the definition of terminal condition varies among jurisdictions,
one formulation provides that a terminal condition is an irreversible condition that will
lead to death in a relatively short time despite the application of life-sustaining treatment.
In a few states, the definition is more restrictive, requiring that death be imminent despite
the application of life-sustaining treatment. Such definitions clearly do not include those
in a persistent vegetative state (hereinafter "PVS") or with a chronic debilitating illness.
Cantor writes that historical reasons for such legislative limitations included concerns
about exploitation of helpless individuals in the medical setting, thinking that government
interests in promoting sanctity of life might override a broader category of patient rights
and perhaps, most importantly, political pressure from religious groups and right-to-life
organizations. Id. at 37. More recently, many states have broadened the application of
living wills to include cases of patients in a persistent vegetative state. See, e.g., 1993 UTAH
LAws 129; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie Supp. 1993).
57. SB 676, § 20A-417(D). Earlier drafts of the bill, however, were considerably more
restrictive. They provided that an agent could not withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment from a patient unless that patient was terminally ill or permanently unconscious,
unless the document expressly authorized the agent to make decisions regarding the with-
holding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining treatment for conditions other than terminal
illness or permanent unconsciousness, or unless the proposed action was consistent with
other instructions of the agent as specified in another medical directive or other writing of
the principal. See, e.g., October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-505(B).
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sustaining treatment to cases in which the patient was terminally ill or
permanently unconscious.58 Early drafts required that if the patient
was in a terminal condition, the surrogate was required to certify in
writing that the decision to withhold or withdraw life support was
based on the known wishes of the patient, or if unable to determine
the patient's wishes, on the patient's best interests.59 If a patient was
in a condition of permanent unconsciousness, the surrogate had to
certify in writing that withholding or withdrawal of life support was
based on the known wishes of the patient.' This provision was later
changed to require the health care provider (rather than the surro-
gate) to certify in writing the basis of the surrogate's decision.6
In addition to these restrictions, a health care provider could not
withhold or withdraw life support if anyone in the statutory list of sur-
rogates, including nieces, nephews and cousins, informed the health
care provider in writing that they disagreed with the instruction of a
higher ranked surrogate.62
Finally, there was a provision that prohibited a health care pro-
vider from complying with the instruction of a surrogate or agent if
the provider believed that the instruction was not "reasonable and
prudent."6" In these cases, the provider was required either to peti-
tion the institution's patient care advisory (ethics) committee for ad-
vice, bring the matter to the attention of a state or local government
agency having authority to protect the welfare of the incapacitated
individual, or file a petition in a court of competent jurisdiction seek-
ing injunctive relief.'
Restrictions or burdens on surrogate or agent decisionmaking
were continued in the guidelines for judges provided in SB 676.65
Life support could not be terminated unless the surrogate or agent
showed there was clear and convincing evidence that the incapaci-
tated patient would not have wanted to be sustained by life-sustaining
58. SB 676, § 20A-502(E). Earlier drafts required that even in those cases, two physi-
cians certify that withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment would be consistent
with generally accepted standards of medical practice. See October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-
604(2); December 13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-603(B).
59. See, e.g., October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-604(B).
60. See, e.g., id. § 20A-604(C).
61. December 13, 1992 Draft, § 20A-602(D)(2); SB 676, 20A-417(D).
62. SB 676, § 20A-503(B) (1).
63. Id. § 20A-503(B) (2) (III).
64. Id. § 20A-207. Previous drafts mandated this action on the part of a physician if the
physician believed that an agent or surrogate was not acting in the best interest of the pa-
tient. October 5, 1992 Draft, § 20A-505(C); December 13, 1992 Draft, §§ 20A-507(B), -
603 (A) (2) (iii).
65. SB 676, §§ 13-601 to -713.
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treatment in his or her present condition 6 or that there was clear and
convincing evidence that this was in the patient's best interest.67
D. Termination of Life Support for Patients in a
Persistent Vegetative State (PVS)
Drafters of the committee bill were extremely cautious about ter-
mination of life support for someone in a persistent vegetative state.'
This was reflected in the criteria that SB 676 required for determining
that someone was, in fact, in such a state. The bill provided that life
support could not be withdrawn from someone in a persistent vegeta-
tive state unless two physicians, one of whom was the patient's attend-
ing physician, certified that "for a period of at least 9 months, the
[patient] has not exhibited any clinical sign of capacity for thought,
purposeful action, [or] awareness of self and environment."69 Alterna-
tively, two physicians, the patient's attending physician and another
who has special expertise in the evaluation of cognitive functioning,
could certify that:
The condition of the individual has persisted for a length of
time sufficient to permit the conclusion, to a reasonable de-
gree of medical probability, that additional time to confirm
the diagnosis [was] unnecessary considering: (1) the ex-
traordinary severity of the trauma or other injury to the brain
or illness affecting the brain that the individual has suffered;
66. Id. § 13-712.
67. Id. § 13-713.
68. This cautious attitude may have been due in part to the circumstances surrounding
In re Cole, No. 8611053/CE49265 (Bato. City Cir. CL, May 9, 1986). Jacqueline Cole suf-
fered a massive and sudden stroke on the morning of March 29, 1986. Ms. Cole's last
words to her daughter before losing consciousness were: "Christina, I don't want to live
like this." Harry A. Cole, Deciding On A Time To Die, 7 SECOND OPINION 1, 2 (1987). The
consensus of Ms. Cole's attending physicians was that Ms. Cole would soon die as a result of
the stroke. She was in a deep coma and was kept alive through the use of life sustaining
treatment. While the doctors felt it would only be a matter of days before this occurred,
Ms. Cole did not die. Though she began suffering secondary illnesses, she hung on to life.
Id. at 5-6. Forty days after Ms. Cole's stroke, her husband petitioned the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City for permission to disconnect her life sustaining treatment. At the hearing,
presided over by Judge John Carroll Byrnes, Ms. Cole's doctors testified that it was not
likely that she would ever regain consciousness, and if she did, she would be a "vegetable."
The likelihood of her ever regaining neurologic recovery was somewhere between one in
one hundred thousand to one in a million. Id. at 7. Judge Byrnes denied the request of
Ms. Cole's husband because he felt more time was needed to study the law on the issue and
that,not enough time had passed in which Ms. Cole had been in a coma. Six days later, Ms.
Cole did ,regain consciousness and today, after much rehabilitative therapy, she has fully
recovered from the stroke. Id. at 9.
69. SB 676, § 20A-106(A).
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and (2) the absence of any potential for rehabilitation of the
individual.7 °
The nine-month waiting period is without basis in the medical litera-
ture and would be considered excessive by some.
71
A second example of the cautiousness of the committee proposal
regarding withholding or withdrawal of life support from someone in
a persistent vegetative state was the prohibition on an agent, surrogate
or judge from basing that decision on a best interest test.
This proposed statutory prohibition on the application of the
best interest test to someone in this condition would have been truly
unique. Courts have been somewhat divided on the best interest test.
A few courts have relied exclusively on a substituted judgment test for
patients in a persistent vegetative state, and ignored the application of
a best interest test.72  Other courts have applied the test to PVS
patients. 75
70. Id. § 20A-106(B).
71. Some physicians have testified that a four to six month comatose period is used to
determine whether there will be any improvement or recovery of a person in a PVS. In re
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (N.J. 1987); see also MULTi-SocETY TASK FORCE ON PVS, MEDICAL
ASPECTS OF THE PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE: STATEMENT OF A MULTI-SOCIETY TASK FORCE
28-29 (Draft #10, Feb. 1, 1993) (reporting that over half of the PVS patients who made
good recoveries from traumatic injuries improved within 3 months, almost all within 6
months of injury, and the rate of recovery from 6 to 12 months was 0.5%; no good recov-
eries reported after 12 months. For patients with nontraumatic injuries, recovery after one
month from injury is unlikely); Council Report, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to
Withdraw or Withhold Life Support, 263JAMA 426, 427-28 (1990) ("Once qualified clinicians
have determined that a person is awake but unaware, the prognosis to the permanence of
[PVS] depends on the age of the patient, the nature of the brain injury, and how long the
period of unawareness has already lasted.... [F]ew if any patients who remain vegetative
following cardiac arrest or similar asphyxial injuries recover after one month and essen-
tially none will regain cognition after 3 vegetative months.... The prognosis for cognitive
return in patients younger than 40 years with head injury or subarachnoid hemorrhage is
somewhat better than above, but still relatively poor.").
72. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Cruzan, By
Cruzan v. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); see also In re O'Connor, 531
N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that hospital was authorized to insert feeding tube into
PVS patient in that there was no clear and convincing proof that patient had made com-
mitment to decline assistance under instant circumstances).
73. See, e.g., In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67-69 (Wis. 1992) (disagreeing with Cruzan and
allowing for an objective best interest analysis); see also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674,
688-91 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that the best interest standard governs surrogate decision-
making); In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 858 (Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a con-
servator of an incompetent person in PVS is authorized to decide to withdraw life support
by conceding conservatee's best interests); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-33 (N.J.
1985) (holding that an objective best interest test can be used narrowly when no evidence
or wishes of the PVS patient exists); In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 456-57
(Wash. 1987) (reasoning that, when there are no objections from family or physicians, no
prior court authorization is needed before a guardian can decide that withdrawing support
is in the best interests of the patient).
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The debate is in part based on how the test is formulated.
Although virtually all courts that have applied the test have character-
ized it as a balancing of the benefits and burdens associated with the
proposed treatment and its alternatives, courts have differed in the
weight they give various burdens and benefits and from whose per-
spective to weigh them. Under a benefits and burdens analysis, a
number of courts have limited the relevant burdens of a patient to
pain and suffering.74 This formulation is problematic in the context
of PVS patients who can feel no pain. Few courts have considered the
broader issue of the dignity of the patient.75 Furthermore, courts
have determined the benefits and burdens to the patient from the
perspective of her present condition, ignoring her history and making
no effort to extrapolate from her prior lifestyle and values what type of
decision she would make in her current situation. 6 In effect, the test
is a purely objective one asking what would the reasonable person in
this situation want, not attempting to incorporate any relevant values
of the patient.77
A few courts have added a consideration of a patient's values to
the list of issues to be considered in the best interest determination,
modifying the purely objective criteria to a "limited-objective" test, but
then have significantly restricted the weight to be given those values.7
There are limitations to even this formulation of the best interest test,
especially for a patient who was never competent or whose history is
unknown.79 Courts in such instances have used a more broadly based
reasonable person standard, asking how would the reasonable (com-
74. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232-33 (insisting on a determination of suffering to
apply best interest test); Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 218, 618 A.2d 744, 759 (1993) (re-
jecting use of best interest test for patient not in pain because it requires the court to make
a quality-of-life judgment).
75. See, e.g., In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d at 72-73 & n.17 (discussing dignity as a factor).
76. Id. at 70 (explaining how the best interest test does not involve analysis of patients'
values).
77. Stewart G. Pollack, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and by What Standards?,
41 RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 520-25 (1989); Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102
HFARv. L. REv. 375, 396-403 (1988). The legal literature on the reasonable person standard
is generally unhelpful in implementing the best interest test for someone in a persistent
vegetative state. Focusing on negligence and fault, the literature does not address the stan-
dard to which a permanently unconscious individual is to be held. In general, the law
provides that "[a]s to his physical characteristics, the reasonable person may be said to be
identical with the actor." SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 32, at 175 (5th ed. 1984). As far as mental characteristics are concerned, however,
the prevailing standard is an objective one, e.g., to hold the actor to the intelligence and
reasoning of the standard man. Id. at 176.
78. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
79. See, e.g., In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67-69 (1992); In re Moorhouse, 593 A.2d 1256,
1262 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1991); In re Lawrence, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37-43 (Ind. 1991); In
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petent) person weigh the benefits and burdens of continued treat-
ment if in a persistent vegetative state."' Classic reports in the
bioethics literature have briefly addressed this issue," l and scholars
also have struggled with it.82
re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1374-78 (Wash. 1984); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-74 (N.Y.),
cert. dented, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
80. See In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992). L.W. was a 79- year-old man with a long
history of chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia who had been institutionalized since
1951. He had no close friends or relatives and had never indicated his wishes concerning
life-sustaining treatment. On May 31, 1989, L.W. suffered a heart attack, which caused him
to enter a persistent vegetative state. The guardian of L.W. petitioned the court for a
declaratory judgment to determine whether the guardian or the court had authority to
consent to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 63-64. The court ruled that
where substituted judgment cannot be used, the proper standard is a best interest test that
focuses "solely on what is currently in the patient's best interest." Id. at 70. Where the
surrogate does not have reliable evidence of the patient's wishes, he must refer to "more
objective, societally shared criteria." Id. These objective factors include: "The degree of
humiliation, dependence, and loss of dignity probably resulting from the condition and
treatment; the life expectancy and prognosis for recovery with and without treatment; the
various treatment options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits of each of those op-
tions." Id. at 72 (citing Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1231). In In re Quinlan, the court modified the
objective best interest test when it reasoned that if Karen Quinlan was alive to look at her
situation she would decide upon discontinuance of her life-support apparatus. In re Quin-
lan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
81. A report by the Hastings Center on termination of life support advocates that for
patients who lack decisionmaking capacity, if there is not enough known about the pa-
tient's wishes and values, a surrogate should "choose so as to promote the patient's inter-
ests as they would probably be conceived by a reasonable person in the patient's
circumstances...." THE HAsTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SuS-
TAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 28 (1987) [hereinafter HAsrNGS CENTER
GUIDELINES]. This takes on a specific meaning when dealing with a patient with irreversible
loss of consciousness. The report explains that
[p]atients who are permanently unconscious are unaware of benefits or burdens.
The only possible benefit to them of life-sustaining treatment is the possibility
that [their] diagnosis . . . is wrong and they will regain consciousness. Accord-
ingly, the major considerations are whether a reasonable person in the patient's
circumstance would find that this benefit, as well as the benefits to the patient's
family and concerned friends (such as satisfaction in caring for the patient and
the meaningfulness of the patient's continued survival) are outweighed by the
burdens on those loved ones (such as financial loss or emotional suffering).
Id. at 29.
82. Rhoden argues that the objective best interest test "is unworkable because it too
radically separates the patient's present plight from her past personality." Rhoden, supra
note 77, at 397. Furthermore, a weighing of the burdens and benefits of treatment to a
PVS patient is highly problematic in that nothing benefits or burdens a comatose patient.
Id. at 399. She goes on to argue that we must reject the present-oriented objective test
because viewing the patient "only in the immediate present divides the patient from her
past, her history, her values, and her relationships-from all those things that make her
human." Id. at 418. She offers a family decisionmaking model that "best embodies patient
preferences," and argues it should be up to doctors to prove the family is wrong, not up to
the family to prove that they are right. Id. at 437-41.
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In its report to the legislature, the drafting committee explained
its proposal prohibiting application of a best interest test to patients in
a persistent vegetative state as follows:
Because of their unique situation, these patients are able to
live for years, even decades, without experiencing pain. Life-
support may be withdrawn from them by a surrogate if it is
established that would be the patient's wish. An agent may
authorize removal of life support if that is within the agent's
authority. If there is no basis for believing the PVS patient
would want life-support withdrawn, or if there is no agent
with the authority to do so, life-support should not be with-
drawn. These very rare cases (where there is neither a living
will nor a health care agent and substituted judgment by
family members or other surrogates is impossible) deserve
the special attention of the General Assembly in separate
legislation.83
The need for the legislature to address this issue became evident as a
result of the case of Mack v. Mack 4 The dispute in that case was over
whether feeding tubes could be withdrawn from Ronnie Mack, a
young man who had been in a persistent vegetative state for over eight
years.8 5 In Mack, the trial court determined that there was not "clear
and convincing" evidence of the patient's wishes, and because Mack
was not in pain, the court would not apply the best interest test."6 The
case was appealed and decided by the Court of Appeals."7 The final
decision was issued on February 2, 1993, in the midst of the legislative
session in which the Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 was being de-
bated. The Court of Appeals held that
[a] best interest test applied . . . to any patient who is in a
persistent vegetative state, who is not in pain, and who is not
terminally ill, requires this Court to make a quality-of-life
For a view supporting the objective best interest test, see Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death,
and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARiz. L. REV.
373, 374 (1986). Dresser argues for a "systematic assessment of an incompetent patient's
contemporaneous interests," id. at 374, finding that relying on past preferences and rea-
sonable person values in reality allows third parties to have their interests taken into ac-
count without acknowledging that this is the case and thus subordinating the interests of
the patient to the interests of others. Id. at 389-90. She argues for an inquiry that starts
with an assessment of the patient's present situation and interests and then possibly factors
in "external considerations" such as the patient's past preferences, the family interest, and
others to see how the treatment decision should be effected. Id. at 390-92.
83. REPORT OF THE BiLL DRAFTING COMM., supra note 13, at 9-10.
84. 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
85. Id. at 191, 618 A.2d at 746.
86. Id. at 195-96, 618 A.2d at 748.
87. Id. at 196, 618 A.2d at 748.
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judgment under judicially adopted standards, without any
legislative guidelines. There are many reasons why it is not
appropriate for this Court to do so.... Where the values
themselves are in a state of flux in society, a legislative body is
better equipped to determine, within constitutional limits,
whether some lives are not worth living and, if so, how to
determine which are the lives that are not worth living.88
Thus, the highest state court was looking to the state legislature for
some way to deal with this seemingly intractable dilemma.
Despite public opposition, drafters of the committee report
urged the legislature, in effect, not to grapple with the inherent diffi-
culties of applying the best interest test to someone in a PVS. Instead
they urged the legislature to adopt the position that the test was not
applicable. This approach would deprive those in a PVS, who were
never competent or never clearly expressed their views on the issue, to
a state of "indefinite limbo."89
E. Length, Detail, and Complexity
The last issue of concern to many individuals was the length, de-
tail, and complexity of the committee proposals. 90 For every grant of
authority, there seemed to be a caveat, and for every caveat, an excep-
tion. This style contributed to the bill's length. An illustration of this
was a provision about who could and could not be a health care agent:
(A) (1) Except as provided in subsection (B) of this section,
a principal may appoint any competent individual at least 18
years old as a health care agent.
(B) The following individuals may not serve as a health care
agent:
(1) The attending physician of the principal or an em-
ployee of the attending physician; or
(2) An owner, operator, or employee of a health care
facility from which the principal is receiving health care.
(C) The provisions of subsection (B) of this section do not
apply if:
(1) The principal and the agent are related within a de-
gree listed under § 2-202 of the family law article; or
88. Id. at 218-19, 618 A.2d at 759-60.
89. Id. at 235-38, 618 A.2d at 768-69 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).,
90. See, e.g., Testimony of Wanda Hurt, Health Care For All Coalition, before theSen-
ate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 2 (Feb. 23, 1993) ("In contrast [to SB 664] SB 676 is a
lengthy, convoluted piece of legislation.... The end result is the creation of an unwieldy
and hard to understand set of guidelines for health care decision making."') ,, , .
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(2) The principal and the agent are clergy or other
members of the same community of persons who:
(I) Are bound to a religious life;
(II) Conduct or assist in the conduct of religious
services; and
(III) Actually and regularly engage in a religious,
benevolent, charitable, or educational ministry, or the per-
formance of health care services; or
(3) The principal attaches to the power of attorney for
health care decisions an affidavit attesting that the agent is
the attending physician of the principal or an employee of
the attending physician and:
(I) Has known the principal for at least 2 years;
(II) Is familiar with the personal affairs and reli-
gious and moral beliefs of the principal through regular con-
tact; and
(III) Is willing and able to serve as a health care
agent.91
The provision illustrates another difference between SB 676 and SB
664. The committee proposal appeared to try to cover every possible
situation-virtually every concept was defined. Its level of detail was
impressive. The detail, however, made SB 676 extremely constraining
and overly legalistic. A number of individuals criticized the proposal
as "nonuser friendly."92 In a letter to Senator Walter Baker, Chair of
the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, John H. Pickering, Chair
of the ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, shared his
experience in working on the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act
drafting committee. He articulated three criteria that the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
found important for drafting Health Care Decisions Acts.9" The first
criterion was that the Act be "readable, understandable, and usable by
the general public."94 He went on to say that:
This quality is essential if we are to succeed in getting people
to use advance directives and getting providers to comply
with them. Even though every state now has some form of
advance directive legislation, still less than 20 percent of the
91. SB 676, § 20A415.
92. Letter from John H. Pickering, Chair, ABA Comm'n on Legal Problems of the
Elderly to Senator Walter Baker, Chair, Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 2 (Mar. 2,
1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Pickering].
_; 93. The first was readability, the second, flexibility, and the third, that standing be
addressed clearly. Id. at 2-3.
94. Id. at*2.
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adult population has any type of written directive. Applying
this criterion, S.B. 676 falls short, primarily because so many
issues are addressed in multiple provisions throughout the
bill, often with slight nuances in terminology, scope, and
meaning. The redundancy engenders more confusion than
clarity.95
Others expressed similar concerns with the bill's complexity.96 The
drafters of the bill did not appear to take these criticisms seriously as
indicated in their final report to the legislature:
[This] bill is a concise treatment of a number of separate but
closely interrelated issues in this complex field. While it is
true that the bill could be divided into five or six "short bills"
95. Id. Pickering provided several examples of redundancy in the proposal:
conscience objections are treated in §§ 20A-208 and -407; rules of construction in
sections 20A-102, -103 and -410; liability issues in §§ 20A-209, -409, -421, and -505;
prohibited decisions in §§ 20A-418, -419, -503, and -504; portability of advance
directives in §§ 20A-412 and -413; revocation in §§ 20A-403 and -420; and deci-
sionmaking standards in §§ 20A-417,-512, and 13-711(B). Each of these issues
could be more clearly treated and effectively addressed in single or combined
sections of the act.
Id.
96. See, e.g., Remarks ofJohn F. Fader II, Judge, Baltimore County District Court, dis-
tributed atJudicial Institute and November 18, 1993 conference, on "The Right to Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment in Maryland" ("This 'people business' we are in requires the use
of language less cumbersome, more understandable and better organized. Understanding
legislation should not be the prerogative of those trained in the law or medicine . . .");
letter from Diane E. Hoffmann and Karen Rothenberg to Judge John Carroll Byrnes, Con-
ference of Circuit Court Judges 4 (Dec. 8, 1992) (on file with author) ("[Wle and most
others we have spoken to, object to the complexity and length of the document. Although
many laws are lengthy and complex, for most, attorneys are hired to assist people [sic]
comply. In this area, most people are not going to seek the assistance of an attorney to
educate themselves about this issue. Yet all people will die and many will face a situation
where they will have to decide whether they want life sustaining treatment for themselves
or for a family member. This draft has numerous subtleties that most people will not
understand. As a result many people may be hurt by their lack of knowledge of the law");
testimony of David S. Davis, M.D., J.D., Maryland Chapter of the American College of
Emergency Physicians, before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 1 (Feb. 23, 1993)
("At this level of decision-making, patients and doctors must feel comfortable with their
understanding of the law. Otherwise, they remain in turmoil emotionally. SB 676 is too
complex, with too many exceptions and cross-references. Doctors will fear they are 'miss-
ing' something technical. They will refer all to the hospital attorney, who is not the best
person to advise in this situation. . . ."); Letter from Steven A. Levenson, M.D., to.Judge
John Carroll Byrnes, Circuit Court for Baltimore City 2 (Jan. 19, 1993) (on file with au-
thor) ("[T]his bill is highly legalistic and verbose, and by trying to anticipate and define all
possible situations becomes so meandering as to confuse rather than clarify. As written, it
will not be usable by ordinary citizens and physicians, but will require more lawyers ,to
interpret. As I see it, a major thrust of ethics decisions in this country in the past decade
has been to get the lawyers out of these processes, and enable ordinary citizens'to take care
of these issues themselves in conjunction with their physicians, not to make lawyers even
more indispensable.")
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addressing each of these issues separately, virtually everyone
agrees that one bill integrating all related issues is preferable
to a piecemeal approach .... To "shorten" the bill signifi-
candy would require throwing something significant over-
board just to lighten the boat. That would likely mean
having to build another boat or two later; and that in turn
might produce a small flotilla of boats going in different di-
rections and also increase the risk of "accidental drowning"
of an important health care right or protection.97
III. SENATE BILL 664
Senate Bill 664, as introduced, covered virtually the same ground
as SB 676, in almost half the space. In comparison to SB 676, SB 664
was notable for its brevity, ease of understanding, simplified forms,
and exclusion of many of the restrictions of SB 676.98
Senate Bill 664 included a single advance directive form that
would allow individuals either to appoint an agent, leave instructions
for receipt of health care, or do both.9" This was in contrast to SB
676, which included a restrictive and mandatory living will form and
no form for a durable power of attorney for health care.100 The form
in SB 664 was optional and included a check off for individuals to
express their preferences regarding various alternatives.10' Testimony
at the legislative hearings on the bill indicated that the inclusion of a
single form was of particular importance to elderly groups within the
state:
Our senior citizen clients have made it clear to us that
they do not want to have to consult an attorney in order to
write an advance directive. SB 664 provides a suggested form
which combines the terms of a living will and a health care
power of attorney. This is an improvement on the current
situation in which there are two similar documents which ap-
ply to different situations. Our clients often express confu-
sion about what each does and about whether they should
sign one or both documents. This bill resolves this confu-
sion by providing one comprehensive form in which the de-
clarant makes treatment choices and chooses an agent if she
97. REPORT OF THE BILL DRAFrING COMM., supra note 13, at 3; see also Letter from Judge
John Carroll Byrnes, Chairman, Drafting Comm., to Sen. John A. Pica, Chairman, Health
Care Decision-Making Subcomm., Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 1 (Dec. 13, 1992).
,98. See SB 664; SB 676, 1993 Md. Regular Session.
;- 99. See SB 664, § 5-603.
1.00. SB 676, § 20A-406.
101. See SB 664, § 5-603.
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or he wishes. The bill provides that assisting a person in fill-
ing out the form does not constitute the practice of law. This
means that health care providers, senior center staff, and
others may help people fill out the form without the neces-
sity of legal consultation. 10
2
Similar sentiments were expressed by other groups.1 0 3 In keeping
with the notion that this type of legislation should be user-friendly,
John H. Pickering stated that a second goal of the Uniform Health
Care Decisions Act's drafters was the inclusion of a "single, flexible
advance directive form that enables an individual to appoint a proxy
to provide instructions about life-sustaining procedures, and to ad-
dress any other health related matters."'0 4 Pickering criticized SB 676
in its effort to "salvage the existing Maryland living will statute and
form by tacking on new language" and by requiring that all living wills
confirm substantially to the statutory form. 05
The model forms in SB 664 did, however, present problems for
some. Critics contended that "[f] orms set out in a statute, though la-
beled optional, tend to become the norm. Health care providers be-
come used to seeing the standard form and become wary if something
else is presented. Therefore, the specific contents of even an optional
statutory form ought to be carefully reviewed." 0 6
Senate Bill 664 also expanded the conditions under which a liv-
ing will would become effective to include not only terminal illness
and persistent vegetative state but also an "inevitably fatal condi-
tion.""7 This was defined as "an advanced, progressive condition
caused by injury, disease, or illness as a result of which an individual:
(1) has already suffered severe debilitation; and (2) to a reasonable
102. Letter from Joan O'Sullivan, Senior Citizens Law Project of the Legal Aid Bureau,
Inc., to Walter M. Baker, Chairman, Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 2 (Feb. 23, 1993)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from O'Sullivan].
103. See, e.g., Testimony ofJane P. Merkin, American Jewish Congress, National Capital
Region, before Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. (Feb. 23, 1993) (quoting the Con-
gress's Bio-Ethics Task Force that the legal requirements for selecting and directing an
agent should be simple so as to be accessible to the average person without having to
consult a lawyer or participate in a court proceeding).
104. Letter from Pickering, supra note 92, at 2.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Comments of Judge John Carroll Byrnes, Chair, Bill Drafting Comm., to Senate
Judicial Proceedings Comm. 1 (Undated document tide: Concerns about SB 664) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Comments of Byrnes].
107. SB 664, § 5-603; see Advance Medical Directive Health Care Instructions, Part C.'
The earliest drafts of SB 664 included no provisions limiting the authority of the surrogate
to specific conditions as no such limits were placed on surrogates in similar laws in Virginia
and the District of Columbia. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Supp. '1993); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989).
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degree of medical probability, will suffer further irreversible deteriora-
tion until a medically foreseeable death, whether or not life-sustaining
procedures are provided."0 This provision was unique in state living
will statutes, which for the most part limit their application to cases in
which a patient is terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state. 109
Thus, its inclusion was relatively progressive. It had the potential to
include the following types of conditions:
" Degenerative neurological disorders, such as advanced
Alzheimer's disease, ALS (Lou Gehrig's disease), advanced
multiple sclerosis, major stroke, or head injury with damage to
critical vegetative function centers;
" Heart diseases such as advanced congestive cardiomyopathy
and severe heart damage from multiple or extensive heart
attacks;
" Renal disease, in particular advanced chronic renal failure;
" Liver disease such as alcoholic cirrhosis with liver failure;
" Pulmonary disease such as advanced emphysema; and
* Multisystem organ failure including general deterioration or
decline due to the failure of multiple organs or organ systems
as a result of the cumulative effects of age and multiple
illnesses. 110
Although considered important by many groups, in particular the
state chapter of the AARP and the Alzheimer's Association, this provi-
sion also evoked considerable criticism. The Maryland Catholic Con-
ference argued that inclusion of those patients with "inevitably fatal
conditions" was the most "frightening aspect" of the bill. 11'
Acceptance of this concept, in our view, would embrace
the . . . "ethic of euthanasia." We urge that you not take this
perilous leap. Leaping to final decisions in the matters of liv-
ing will, durable power of attorney, and surrogate decision-
108. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (k).
109. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
l10. See Facsimile of Summary of Maryland Medical Directors Assoc., Position on Bills
Related to Health Care Decision Making, to Professor Diane E. Hoffmann, University of
Maryland School of Law 3 (Feb. 21, 1993) (on file with author) (explaining the definition
of "inevitably fatal conditions" and supporting SB 664 in part because such conditions are
included).
111. Letter from Richard J. Dowling, The Maryland Catholic Conference, to Hon. Ste-
phen J. Braun, Chairman, Durable Power of Attorney Work Group, House Environmental
Matters Subcomm. and Subcomm. Members 7 (Mar. 16,1993) (on file with author) ("Per-
haps the most frightening aspect of [SB 664 and its complement] HB 1432... is the mea-
sure's endorsement of decisions to prematurely end the lives of individuals who, though
they have suffered 'severe debilitation' and face 'further deterioration,' do not have termi-
nal conditions, do not face imminent death, and are not in a permanent vegetative state.").
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making are perilous enough and these matters have been
the subjects of study and debate for more than a decade.
This new concept-appealing to some, so very frightening to
others-needs a good deal more cooking before it should
merit consideration as public policy.
112
SB 664 also expanded the conditions under which a surrogate
could make a decision to withhold or withdraw life support to include
not only terminal illness and persistent vegetative state but also "inevi-
tably fatal condition." The controversy generated by this provision ap-
peared to reflect different views of the role of the family in
decisionmaking for incapacitated patients. The two comments below
illustrate the contrasting views on the issue:
The bill presupposes and expresses belief in the good faith
of individuals, their families and close friends. This means
that by and large, medical decision making is left to private
citizens in consultation with their doctors. If there is dissen-
sion among those persons, the decision may go to an institu-
tion's ethics committee. The presumption of good faith will
allow these decisions to be made by those closest to the pa-
tient, without interference from outside decisionmakers,
such as the court system.'
It is too easy for healthy people, even with the best of
motives, to look at someone with a physical or mental impair-
ment and conclude that since the healthy person would not
want to have so diminished a quality of life, it must be in the
patient's best interest to forgo treatment. And, the sad truth
is, some families are dysfunctional, and surrogate decisions
made by members of those families deserve careful scrutiny.
Without a definition of "best interest" that is limited to the
patient's medical circumstances and without a state role for
health care providers, how are misguided decisions to be
averted?' 1 4
112. Id. Drafters of the committee proposal also criticized this aspect of the bill. See
Comments of Byrnes, supra note 106, at 2 ("The advanced directive in § 5-603 contains a
paragraph... allowing someone to say, often far in advance of the actual situation, that if
he or she has an inevitably fatal condition, 'I direct that my life not be extended by life
prolonging procedures, including the administration of nutrition and hydration through
tubes.' A person without the benefit of anything remotely like an informed consent discus-
sion will thus be refusing in advance even minimally burdensome life-sustaining proce-
dures like antibiotics, when so simple a treatment might prolong the person's life
significantly.").
113. Letter from O'Sullivan, supra note 102, at 2.
114. Comments of Byrnes, supra note 106, at 1.
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Senate Bill 664 also reduced burdens on surrogate deci-
sionmakers and gave a clearer priority for decisionmaking to those
most likely to be closest to the patient."5 Under SB 676, if someone
farther down the list of surrogates disagreed with someone higher on
the list, a physician could not follow the instructions of the person
with decisionmaking priority." 6 The result of such a rule would be
that a patient's fairly distant relative, his nephew for example, could
veto the decision of the patient's spouse, even though the patient had
been married for many years and had expressed his views on life sup-
port to his spouse. In contrast, under SB 664, the presumption was
that the family member higher on the list was acting in good faith in
making a decision to withhold or withdraw treatment. If a more dis-
tant family member disagreed, the burden would be on that distant
family member to take the case to court. Senate Bill 664 also included
a provision allowing for resolution of disputes among surrogates of
the same class-adult children or siblings-by the attending physician
referring the case to the health care institution's patient care advisory
(ethics) committee."1
In contrast to SB 676, Senate Bill 664 bolstered the authority of
surrogates and agents by prohibiting a health care provider from over-
riding the instructions of the surrogate or agent 18 without going to
court and proving that the agent or surrogate was not following statu-
tory guidelines for decisionmaking."' The bill also allowed a surro-
gate or agent to apply a best interest test to someone in a persistent
vegetative state.1 20 The difficulties of applying the test to someone
unable to experience benefits or burdens was indirectly dealt with by
the definition given to the term. The coalition proposal and SB 664
provided that "in determining what is' in the patient's best interest a
surrogate shall consider: (I) the prognosis of the patient for recovery;
(II) the risks, benefits, and burdens of any proposed procedure, and
the alternatives to any proposed procedure; and (III) the religious be-
liefs and basic values of the patient receiving treatment."' 21 The defi-
nition, thus, was not purely objective.
Also, unlike early versions of SB 676, SB 664 made no distinction
between artificial nutrition and hydration and other forms of life- sus-
115. Compare SB 664, § 5-605(A) with SB 676, § 20A-501 (C).
116. SB 676, § 20A-503(B)(1).
117. See SB 664, § 5-605(B).
118. Id. § 5-610(B).
119. Id. § 5-605(H).
120. Id. § 5-603.
121. Id. § 5-605(C) (2).
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taining medical treatment other than to allow individuals to make that
distinction, if they wished, in their advance directive form.122
In line with a new trend in health care decisionmaking statutes,
SB 664 included a provision allowing emergency medical technicians
to honor "Do Not Resuscitate Orders" in the prehospital setting. 123
SB 676 included no such provision.
Senate Bill 664 also modified the existing guardianship law to al-
low a guardian to authorize the withholding or withdrawal of life- sus-
taining treatment without court approval if the patient had executed
an advance directive expressing a desire not to receive life support
under the circumstances at issue or if the guardian was a close relative
of the patient.124 These provisions would be effective unless the court,
upon appointment of the guardian, expressly stated that the guardian
did not have this authority.1 2 1
Lastly, SB 664 was perceived as short, understandable, and user
oriented. Numerous individuals who testified at hearings on the two
proposals made comments to this effect. The comments of Joan
O'Sullivan, a Legal Aid attorney, are illustrative of the comments
made:
One of the best things about this bill, and a prime reason we
support it instead of the competing SB 676 is that it is easily
understandable. SB 664 clearly and concisely sets standards
in a very complex area. It is a piece of legislation that when
codified will be readily accessible to the many lay people and
health care providers who will seek it out. People who read it
will be faced with very difficult, emotional, personal deci-
sions that often must be made quickly. Those consulting it
will not have to seek out the hospital attorney, their own at-
torney, or look to interpretive material to understand what
their rights are, because they are clear on the face of the bill.
This is not tax law; this is law that one way or another will
touch each of us and our loved ones. Therefore, it is impera-
tive that it be comprehensible, and this bill makes it so.
126
122. Both bills allowed patients to specify in their declarations what type of feeding and
hydration assistance they wished to refuse. See SB 664, § 5-603; SB 676, § 20A-407.
123. SB 664, § 5-606, at 10. Approximately 22 states now authorize paramedics to follow
patient preferences outside of the hospital regarding CPR. Choice in Dying, Inc., State
Statutes Governing Non-Hospital Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, RIGHT TO DIE DIGEST (June 1994).
124. SB 664, § 13-708(c)(2)(F). Cf MD. CODE ANN4., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c) (Supp.
1992).
125. Id. § 13-708(c)(2).
126. Letter from O'Sullivan, supra note 102, at 2; see also Testimony of Stephanie M.
Lyon, Alzheimer's Association, before the Maryland House of Delegates Envt'l Matters
Comm. 1 (Mar. 3, 1993) [hereinafter testimony of Lyon) ("House Bill #1432 [SB 6641 is
1094 ['VOL. 53:1064
1994] SYMPOSIUM: TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONMAKING 1095
IV. PHILOSOPHY
At one point in the legislative debate, the chair of the group that
drafted the committee proposal asserted that the two legislative pro-
posals reflected two philosophical schools:
One [school] is very cautious about giving other persons life
and death decisions over others and thus is anxious to estab-
lish some limits, safeguards, and articulated objective legal
standards .... The other school of thought takes the oppo-
site tack. It argues for virtually absolute autonomy, brooking
no interference by anyone at any time for any reason.'2 7
While superficially this characterization of the two bills might
have seemed accurate to a few, it significantly misrepresented the dif-
ferent perspectives on the issues. The differences were much more
subtle and complex and reflected very different views of some funda-
mental issues regarding (a) the role of the state in these types of deci-
sions; (b) the purpose of this type of legislation; (c) the role of the
courts and families in making decisions for incapacitated patients; and
(d) the role of legislation more generally.
A. Role of the State
Perhaps the greatest philosophical difference between the two
proposals was the drafters' view of the role of the state and what con-
stitutes legitimate state or societal interests in these life and death de-
cisions. The crux of the difference might be characterized as a
disagreement over whether the states' interest in these cases should be
limited to a protective stance vis-a-vis the patient or whether the state
relatively simple and understandable. Bill #676 is still twice as long and difficult to under-
stand. My father [the husband of an Alzheimer's victim] would have trouble interpreting it
and I question the ability of any one [sic] outside the legal profession to do so. Most impor-
tantly, I wonder how many health care professionals and providers will take the time to
understand it"); Testimony of Harold P. Gross, National Assoc. of Retired Fed'l Employ-
ees, before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 1 (Feb. 23, 1993) ("We support SB 664
as the better of the two bills because it is less cumbersome and complex than is SB 676.");
Letter from Ruth A. Bristol and Ralph K. White, Subcommittee on Legislation, Broadmead
Residents Association, to Chairman and Members of the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Comm. 1 (Feb. 19, 1993) (on file with author) ("We commend 664 for its conciseness,
-brevity, and understandability. We are especially pleased that it simplifies the execution of
advance medical directives by proposing the use of a single, easy-to-execute model
instrument.").
127. 'Letter from the Hon. John Carroll Byrnes, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, to M.
rk Schulze, Esq., Chairperson, Health Law Section, Maryland State Bar Association 2
(Jan. 11, 1993) (on file with author).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
should impose a result based on an interest wholly its own, apart from
and perhaps hostile to that of the patient. 1 2
Virtually every court that has heard a case involving the termina-
tion of life-sustaining treatment has paid "lip service" to the four state
interests thought to be first articulated in Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz1 29 "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protec-
tion of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of
suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession." 3 ' Despite the courts' consistent articulation of these inter-
ests, they have only rarely used them to override an individual's right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment.1 3 1
The articulation of these state interests in Saikewicz by virtually all
courts is puzzling, given their general inattention to them, and raises
questions as to their basis and evolution. Saikewicz enumerated these
interests without providing "any historical, philosophical or legal anal-
128. See Sallyanne Payton, The Concept of the Person in the Parens Patriae Jurisdiction over
Previously Competent Persons, 17J. MED. & PHIL. 605,640-41 (1992) (stating that "[w] hile most
state courts and legislatures have taken seriously in good faith their fiduciary obligation to
manage the affairs of an incompetent under the parens patriaejurisdiction only for his own
benefit, some others have sought to use the powers granted to them under the parens
patriaejurisdiction to impose on incompetents policies of their own deciding, policies that
are hostile to the interests of the incompetents.").
129. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
130. Id. at 425. The Saikewicz court identified these four state interests in relevant case
law. In particular, the court relied on the opinion in In re President of Georgetown Col-
lege, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. President of Georgetown
College, Inc., 337 U.S. 978 (1964), in which Judge Skelly Wright ordered a blood transfu-
sion over the objection of a young mother. Id. The Georgetown College court "justified its
decision by reasoning that its purpose was to protect three state interests, the protection of
which was viewed as having greater import than the individual right: (1) the state interest
in preventing suicide; (2) a parens patriae interest in protecting the patient's minor chil-
dren from 'abandonment' by their parent; and (3) the protection of the medical profes-
sion's desire to act affirmatively to save life without fear of civil liability."
131. The exceptions have each concerned blood transfusions to Jehovah's Witnesses.
See, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965) (granting motion
to dissolve a temporary restraining order initially issued by the court when "the [Jehovah's
Witness] patient voluntarily submitted himself to and insisted upon medical care [yet]
[s] imultaneously... sought to dictate to treating physicians a course of treatment amount-
ing to medical malpractice"); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 267 N.Y.S.2d
450, 451 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (granting order permitting hospital to administer blood transfu-
sions to save the patient's life when a Jehovah's Witness did not object to blood transfu-
sions but objected, on religious grounds, to signing a written authorization for the
transfusion of blood); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d
537, 538 (per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (holding that, because the welfare
of the unborn child and the mother "are so intertwined and inseparable that it would be
impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them [,] . . .blood transfusions may be
made if necessary to save her life or the life of her child").
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ysis of their inclusion." 13 2 Yet courts routinely base their decisions
upon them. Some insights for their inclusion, however, can be
gleaned from the role of the courts in guardianship cases. It has been
well established that "within the terms of the parens patriaejurisdiction
itself the state ha[s] a duty to protect the lives of its wards and there-
fore ha[s] an interest in doing so."' 3 3 Yet, the doctrine of parens patriae
has its roots in a period of history well before the advent of modem
medical technology, when criteria for a patient's best interest was not
so challenging to determine. Today, it is frequently questionable
whether maintaining a person on life support protects their interests
at all. In fact, "[t]here is widespread acknowledgment that, for some
persons facing fatal afflictions, nonexistence may be preferable to
medical maintenance.""' 4 Thus, the application of a state interest in
the preservation of life' 35 raises the thorny question of whether this
interest would be consistent with the state interest in protecting the
132. Ben A. Rich, The Assault on Privacy in Healthcare Decisionmaking, 68 DEN. U.L. REv. 1,
11 (1991). Rich argues that "the urgent circumstances of the Georgetown case precluded
a careful study of the legitimacy of the state's interests in this situation." Id. at 12 ("'In the
interval of about an hour and twenty minutes between the appearance of the attorneys at
his chambers and the signing of the order at the hospital, the judge had no opportunity
for research as to the substantive legal problems and procedural questions involved. He
should not have been asked to act in these circumstances.' Sadly, many appellate courts
have reviewed similar hasty trial court rulings and have not bothered carefully and critically
to analyze the dubious origins of these four state interests which remain obstacles to pa-
tients who wish to refuse necessary medical treatment."). According to Rich, another per-
plexing aspect of the recitation of the interests is that they are incorporated into cases in
which there is apparently no party representing the state involved in the case. Yet, "[t]here
are ... no reported decisions in which a court has refused to accept jurisdiction on the
grounds that a private physician has no legal right to force treatment on a competent
patient, or that the state is not a party to the proceeding so as to properly invoke either the
parens patriae power or the four state interests." Id. at 13. In view of the courts' willingness
to consider these cases, Rich questions the justiciability of the cases and the standing of
health care providers to bring them to the courts. Id. at 21. While there may be a question
about the standing of health care providers to bring these casks when a patient is compe-
tent, in most instances, the patient is not competent and the case comes to the courts in
the form of a guardianship proceeding. In many states, including Maryland, the court is in
fact the guardian and obviously is an arm of the state. In these cases, the courts are asked
to exercise their parens patriae powers to make a decision that is in the best interests of the
patient.
133. Payton, supra note 128, at 609.
134. CANTOR, supra note 56, at 9; see also Robert A. Pearlman et al., Insights Pertaining to
Patient Assessments of States Worse Than Death, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHics 33 (1993).
135. This state interest has included two separate concerns: (1) an interest in preserv-
ing the life of a particular patient; and (2) an interest more generally in the sanctity of life.
The assumption justifying this state interest in treatment refusal cases is that "if the state,
through its licensed medical practitioners, hospitals and courts, allowed patients to decide
to refuse life-sustaining treatment, it would inevitably result in a widespread trend which
would ultimately undermine the proposition that life is sacred." CANTOR, supra note 56, at
i .
8MARYLAND LAW REviEw
patient or instead would constitute a "hostile ... state interest in the
'sanctity of life'" at odds with the interests of the patient.13 6
For the most part, courts seem to be aware of the limitations of
this state interest and have therefore "squelched" its application in life
and death cases.'3 7 Instead they have opted for fashioning a resolu-
tion to the cases that they deemed consistent with the best interests of
the patient though often ending that patient's life.' Most courts
seem to follow the general lead of Quinlan on this issue announcing
that the "State's interest contra [termination of life support] weakens
and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily inva-
sion increases and the prognosis dims.""3 9
An exception to this general line of reasoning was recognized by
the Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of Nancy Cruzan, which
stated that the state's interest is an "unqualified interest in life," no
matter what its quality. 4 ' Professor Sallyanne Payton argues that
courts such as the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan that announce a
"paramount state interest in the 'sanctity of life' quite apart from the
interests of the protected person" depart from their traditional role as
patient protectors under a parens patriae doctrine. 14 1 She warns that
Cruzan might not be the last case to address the issue of the weight to
be given state interests and that the issue is also likely to surface in
state legislative debates given dominant political forces in some
jurisdictions.' 42
Professor Payton's remarks shed significant light on the debate in
Maryland between the drafters of the two opposing bills. While both
"sides" characterized their position as based on concerns for protect-
ing the rights of incapacitated patients, 43 the drafters of the coalition
136. Payton, supra note 128, at 610.
137. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. CL App. 1986) ("We
do not believe it is the policy of this State that all and every life must be preserved against
the will of the sufferer. It is incongruous, if not monstrous, for medical practitioners to
assert their right to preserve a life that someone else must live, or, more accurately, endure
for '15 to 20 years.' We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this State to inflict such an
ordeal upon anyone.").
138. "State courts other than the Supreme Court of Missouri [have] asserted a state inter-
est in the 'preservation of life' [but have] construed it as a protective interest in the per-
son." Payton, supra note 128, at 610.
139. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. NewJersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
140. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 420, 422 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
141. Payton, supra note 128, at 610.
142. Id. at 612-13.
143. See, e.g., Letter from the Hon. John Carroll Byrnes, Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, to Consultants 1 (May 5, 1992) (on file with author) ("We share with you the objective.
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proposal were suspicious that the drafters of the committee proposal
were in fact advocating a stance hostile to the best interest of the pa-
tient.1" The language of the proposed preamble illustrates the con-
cern. While some aspects of the preamble were clearly written for the
protection of patients, others were clearly of a hostile nature. 4 5
B. Purpose of LegTislation
The proposed bills appeared to be based on a different under-
standing of the problem they were intended to address. The propo-
nents of both bills seemed to agree that there were problems with
abuse in patient treatment. But each defined abuse differently. The
of crafting a law which permits a principled withholding or withdrawal of LSMT, which is
often unnecessary or futile and also painful and burdensome, without a descent into what I
term an 'inadvertent holocaust,' by so liberalizing these decisions as to put in jeopardy the
lives of the elderly or those suffering from an intellectual, physical, psychological or psychi-
atric disability, or those whose health care preferences are not clearly understood.").
144. Judge Byrnes's letter accompanying the April 30th draft of the committee proposal
confirms this suspicion. He stated: "Three principles, or perspectives, have guided our
work: (1) The importance of every life, no matter its 'quality;,' (2) the importance of indi-
vidual health care decisionmaking; (3) the importance of compromise in all but core val-
ues, that is, not insisting upon only one interpretation or implementation of the first two
principles in this proposed legislation." Id.
Several individuals testified that the focus on state interests was inconsistent with the
interests of the individual. A spokesperson for the Maryland members of the National
Academy of Elder Law Attorneys stated:
The State exists for us, and not we for the State. We all agree that there are few-
some would add, if any-situations where the State has the power to tell a free
person that he or she must submit to physical intrusions that are not wanted. It is
not the province of the State or any State official to tell me or you or anyone that
he is required to be maintained or keep alive [sic], in the face of incurable illness,
because it serves the interests of the State.
Testimony of Ron M. Landsman, National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, before Senate
Judiciary Comm. 3 (Dec. 18, 1992).
145. In particular, the following provisions were problematic:
WHEREAS, the constitutional law of this nation recognizes an individual's
right to both personal health care decision making, complementing the common
law doctrine of informed consent, and the preservation of life; and
WHEREAS, the State of Maryland on behalf of all of its people, has an inter-
est in assuring that legislation to safeguard personal health care decisionmaking
also reflects our societal concern for life preservation, for the needs of minor
dependents who may be affected by a health care decision, and for the profes-
sional and ethical integrity of the health care community; and
WHEREAS, the balance struck by this law furthers the preeminent societal
value that the life of every individual has worth in and of itself and is not to be
devalued by reason of an individual's incapacity or perceived diminished "quality
of life," whether because of emotional, mental, or physical disability or because of
advanced age or economic disadvantage ....
Octobei 5, 1992 Draft at 4.
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advocates of the coalition bill saw the abuses in terms of overtreat-
ment, or continuing to provide treatment to patients against their will
or desires or inconsistent with their best interests. Although the advo-
cates of the committee bill also sought to address the problem of over-
treatment, they were at the same time preoccupied with the problem
of undertreatment; or prematurely terminating or withholding treat-
ment from patients who would otherwise want to be treated or for
whom treatment would be in their best interest.
The two groups also seemed to have different assessments of the
extent of the two types of abuse and placed different weights on their
importance. Advocates of the committee bill appeared to believe that
undertreatment occurred fairly often. They also focused more on un-
dertreatment than did drafters of the coalition proposal, and ap-
peared to believe that overtreatment was not necessarily undesirable
or at least not reprehensible. On the other hand, proponents of the
coalition bill felt that both types of abuse were equally intolerable, but
that undertreatment was rather rare whereas overtreatment was
pervasive.
Although there are few empirical studies of the extent to which
these abuses occur, the minimal literature available on the subject ap-
pears to support the latter view. For example, a recent study of 1400
physicians and nurses found that four times as many of those surveyed
were concerned about burdensome overtreatment as were concerned
about undertreatment, and that thirty-four to thirty-eight percent of
attending physicians, fifty percent of nurses, and seventy percent of
residents reported that they were acting against their consciences by
overtreating terminally ill patients.'46
C. Role of Courts vs. Role of Family
A third significant difference between the proponents of the two
bills was their view of the role of the family in making treatment deci-
sions for cognitively impaired relatives. In general, advocates of the
committee bill appeared more distrustful of family members than ad-
vocates of the coalition bill and seemed concerned about the possibil-
ity that some families might "do in" their relatives out of greed or
some other ill motive. They referred frequently to the "dysfunctional
family." As a result, their bill placed significant roadblocks in the way
of family members and surrogates in making medical treatment deci-
sions, in particular, decisions to withhold or withdraw life support.
146. Mildred Z. Solomon et al., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional Views on Life-
Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 14, 16 (1993).
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Their bill required, in many cases, that family members go to court
and bear the burden of proving that their ill relative would want to
discontinue life support or that its discontinuation or denial would be
in the patient's best interest.
Conversely, advocates of the coalition bill felt that family mem-
bers were in a better position to make these decisions and should be
authorized to do so. To the extent that safeguards were put in place,
these advocates felt that they should not interfere with or burden car-
ing, loving family members making health care decisions for incapaci-
tated patients. This sentiment was expressed by several individuals
who testified on the bills:
[B]ill #1243 [SB 676] feels burdensome to families. It seems
to place its emphasis on the interests of the state, not those
of the family. It seems to expect families to make bad deci-
sions and it therefore goes to great lengths to tell families
how to make them. We know that someday we will probably
have to make some painful decisions about my mother's
care. We know how she would like us to make those deci-
sions, and what she would want them to be. We knew her
better than anyone else, we are a part of her. The state must
trust us to make the right decisions.14 7
Most courts have recognized family members as appropriate deci-
sionmakers in these cases 148 and a number of authors have written on
the appropriateness of family members as decisionmakers for incapac-
itated patients with regard to the withholding or withdrawal of life-
147. Testimony of Lyon, supra note 126, at 1-2. Ms. Lyon's mother has Alzheimer's
disease.
148. See, e.g., In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987) ("Family members are best quali-
fied to make substituted judgments for incompetent patients not only because of their
peculiar grasp of the patient's approach to life, but also because of their special bonds with
him or her. Our common human experience informs us that family members are gener-
ally most concerned with the welfare of a patient. It is they who provide for the patient's
comfort, care and best interests, and they who treat the patient as a person, rather than a
symbol of a cause.") (citations omitted). But see In re Pfleghar, 62 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1946) ("From the earliest times, the rights of the relatives of incompetents to act
as or participate in the selection of [a guardian] have been the subject of much discussion
and comment by the courts. It was the ancient rule that heirs and next of kin were to be
looked upon with suspicion, since their interests were presumably adverse to those of the
incompetent. However, in 1774 this theory was criticised (sic], and in Dormer's Case, 2
P.Wms. 262, an uncle of the lunatic was appointed. In 1815, in one of the early New York
cases, Chancellor Kent in appointing a daughter committee of her mother stated: 'I agree
with what was said by Lord Mansfield in Dormer's case, supra, that there is no sufficient
reason for the old rule against committing the custody of the person and estate of a lunatic
to the heir at law.' Matter of Livingston I Johns. Ch. 436.").
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sustaining treatment.1 49 Similarly, most bioethicists argue that the
family should be given a great deal of discretion in making decisions
for their incapacitated relatives. As Leslie Francis states:
In addition to their knowledge, family members may also be
better motivated than others to be sure that standards for
decision-making--either substituted judgment or the pa-
tient's best interests-are applied carefully and accurately.
Family members may be motivated to seek out information
about the patient's expressed preferences. Similarly, they
may be more motivated than others to pursue the informa-
tion needed to decide what is in the patient's interest-for
example, information about various sources of financing for
care or about alternative facilities for treatment. 150
Although most experts in bioethics and law have argued for greater
family authority in these cases, there is some empirical evidence that
indicates that surrogates often do not make the same decision that the
patient would have made for him or herself.15 ' On the other hand,
there are those who argue that in spite of this many individuals would
prefer that their family members make this decision over other possi-
ble decisionmakers, such as physicians, judges, etcetera.152
D. Role of Legislation More Generally
Finally, the two groups had a fundamental difference of opinion
about the more general role of legislation. The drafters of SB 676
seemed to believe that legislation should be designed for the "bad
149. See, e.g., Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessay Supplement to Living
Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 ViLE. L. REv. 103, 160-68 (1993) (discussing advan-
tages of family decisionmaking).
150. Leslie P. Francis, The Roles of the Family in Making Health Care Decisions for Incompetent
Patients, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 861, 870; see also In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 414 (NJ. 1987)
("Our common experience teaches us that family and close friends care most and best for
a patient. They offer love and support and concern, and have the best interest of the
patient at heart The importance of family in medical treatment decisions is axiomatic.").
151. See, e.g., Nancy R. Zweibel & Christine K Cassel, Treatment Choices at the End of Life:
A Comparison of Decisions by Older Patients and Their Physician-Selected Proxies, 29 GERONTOLO-
GIsT 615 (1989); Richard Uhlmann et al., Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Pa-
tients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY 115 (1988). Studies have shown that in
fact most people would provide more aggressive treatment to others who are terminally ill
than they would want for themselves. Peteris Darzins et al., Treatment for Life-Threatening
Illness, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 736 (1993) (letter) (reporting survey's result that
"[ri espondents chose more aggressive treatment for a[n] [older incompetent adult] they did
not know than for a family member and, in turn, more aggressive treatment for a family
member than for themselves.").
152. See Dallas M. High, Who Will Make Health Care Decisions for Me When I Can't?, 1990J.
AGING & HEALTH 291, 300 (finding that "elderly persons with relatives consistently ex-
pressed preferences for family members to serve as surrogate decision makers").
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actors" in our society. Leslie Bender has described the result of this
approach to legislation:
Although there are, and always will be, a number of bad ac-
tors, most of us do not fall in that category. If we write our
laws or set our standards to curtail the actions and improper
motivations of a small contingent of people on the margin,
we may disempower the majority of us in the center from
acting on noble and virtuous impulses.... [W]e [also] pro-
hibit family members from mercifully ending the suffering of
loved ones or create high legal barriers to families asking for
termination of life-support decisions for incompetent loved
ones based on our fear of bad families. The social and ethi-
cal price of designing our laws and rules for the bad actors is
significant suffering and indignity to innocent, humane peo-
ple because of unnecessary restraints on their freedom to act
out of care in a manner responsive to particularized circum-
stances of need.1
53
Consistent with this view, drafters of the committee bill required
much in the way of written certification and justification of actions by
clear and convincing evidence. An example of this perspective in
early drafts was that artificial nutrition and hydration could not be
withdrawn or withheld from an incapacitated patient unless that pa-
tient had previously stated expressly in writing or orally their desire
not to be kept alive by artificial nutrition and hydration. Many critics
of the proposal saw such a requirement as unrealistic because it as-
sumed that common citizens are aware of conditions such as persis-
tent vegetative state and the use of artificial nutrition and hydration
and that they can clearly articulate their views about specific types of
treatment. 54 In response to such requirements, Professor Karen
153. Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Active Eu-
thanasia, 59 TENN. L. REV. 519, 532 (1992).
154. In Mack v. MackJudge Chasanow expressed some of this skepticism toward judicial
inquiries into what the PVS patient had expressed while competent in his discussion of the
intent of Ronald Mack:
First, I doubt that very many healthy, robust young people, like Ronald was, ever
seriously consider that they may someday be in an accident and be reduced to a
persistent vegetative state. Even if some did contemplate such a horrible event,
how many would have clearly and convincingly formed and evidenced their views
that, if in a persistent vegetative state, they would at some point choose to termi-
nate artificial life support or, alternatively, that they would choose to remain in
that state until they die of "old age."
Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 236, 618 A.2d 744, 768 (1993) (Chasanow, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also Hamann, supra note 149, at 105-06 (reporting that,
despite the development of living wills and durable powers of attorney, "studies suggest
that as few as nine percent of the population have executed living wills").
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Rothenberg testified on the overly legalistic tone of SB 676, arguing
that the "proposal ... ignores reality... [because] not all feelings and
contingencies can be codified." a55
Drafters of the committee bill had a different perspective and
were critical of SB 664 for its lack of detail. In a letter to Senators on
the Judicial Proceedings Committee one member stated:
All citizens, ill and well, physicians, and health care facil-
ities want clarity in the law. Clarity is best served by having
distinct sections governing living wills, powers of attorney,
surrogates, provider authority, and guardianships. [SB 664]
collapses these distinctions, perhaps in pursuit of brevity.
But while combining different subjects may give the ap-
pearance of a "simple bill," the mixing may serve only to con-
fuse in the long run. We thought it was everyone's objective
to keep these intimate questions out of the court. To accom-
plish that, the law should cleanly delineate the roles and re-
sponsibilities of the various decisionmakers. Potential
questions have to be answered, not left unanswered. When
they are answered, the bill naturally becomes longer; but
those answers and that length will help citizens and doctors
and nurses make health care decisions without the uncer-
tainty that leads to court involvement. 156
The critics were especially concerned about undefined or un-
derdefined terms such as medically ineffective treatment 57 and best
interests.
V. TRANSLATION OF PHILOSOPHY INTO POLICIES
In its deliberations, for the most part the legislature seemed to
accept the philosophies underlying the coalition proposal or to adopt
155. Testimony of Karen Rothenberg, Professor, University of Maryland School of Law,
before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 1 (Dec. 18, 1992).
156. Letter from Jack Schwartz, Chief Counsel, Opinions & Advice, Office of the Attor-
ney General, to Senators Walter M. Baker and John A. Pica 3 (Feb. 3, 1993) (on file with
author).
157. As stated by one group:
There is an additional violation of personal autonomy in SB 664. It is section 5-
609.... Physicians would not have to provide treatment that physicians deter-
mine to be "medically unnecessary" or "ethically inappropriate." Astonishingly,
neither term is defined. It is entirely up to the subjective judgment of the physi-
cian. This is an egregious example of physician paternalism trumping patient
autonomy. While not the best definition possible, the definition of medically in-
effective in SB 676 provides at least some protection for vulnerable patients.
Letter from Roger Stenson, Exec. Dir., Maryland Right to Life, Inc., to Senator Walter M.
Baker, Chairman, Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 1-2 (Feb. 26, 1993) (on file with
author).
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a compromise approach reflecting concerns of both schools of
thought.
A. Personal Autonomy/State Interests/Preamble
Ultimately, with respect to the state interest debate, the legisla-
ture rejected an approach that could be construed as hostile to pa-
tients and adopted a protective stance. Although the ultimate
legislation includes a brief preamble, it makes no mention of the
state's interest in life, only in protecting the lives of the vulnerable
from abuse. 158 Consistent with this view was the deletion from the bill
of the restrictions on a competent patient with minor children to re-
fuse life-sustaining treatment. In omitting this provision, key legisla-
tors may have recognized the inconsistency of such a provision"5 9 and
the repugnancy of its implementation."n The implementation of
such a rule might require that the court either hold the patient "in
contempt of court" and placed in jail "for failing to submit to treat-
158. While the preamble does refer to a "societal value" that the life of every individual
has worth in and of itself and is not to be devalued by reason of an individual's incapacity
or perceived diminished "quality of life," that sentiment was tied to a concern about dis-
crimination toward individuals who are emotionally, mentally, or physically disabled or
because of their age or economic disadvantage. Thus, it reflects the protective perspective.
A small minority viewed this compromise as unbalanced: "In the best of this legisla-
tion, the attempted balance, between a medically incompetent person's right to die and
the state's interest in preserving life, is weighted on the side of an effort to help someone
get out of the way." Testimony of Steve Shaneman, Director, Family Protection Lobby,
before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 1 (Feb. 23, 1993).
159. Ben Rich has pointed out that a provision limiting a competent adult's right to
consent or refuse to consent to treatment on the basis of the rights of a minor child, if
taken to its logical conclusion,
would be to assert that a... minor child could prevent the ... adult parent from
engaging in any inherently dangerous activity, such as skydiving, hang-gliding, or
mountain-climbing, on the grounds that he or she created an unreasonable risk
of death or grave injury that could deprive the family of its "right" to his or her
continued existence in the home. We have never, as a society founded upon the
principles of liberty and self-determination, embraced such a proposition.
... Fathers and mothers of minor children can engage in the full range of
lawful but nevertheless inherently dangerous activities-they can use tobacco
products and consume alcoholic beverages, they can even separate, divorce, and
permanently remove themselves from the minor child's life, subject only to state
laws governing financial support. Indeed, the state even countenances the ulti-
mate voluntary abandonment, placing the child in an adoptive home. Logically,
an individual's right to autonomy, privacy and bodily integrity inherent in the
informed consent doctrine should hold with the same vigor for parents of minor
children as it does for any other competent adult.
Rich, supra note 132, at 14-15.
160. This provision actually was deleted by Senator Pica from the committee proposal
before he introduced SB 676.
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ment" or "have the patient taken from his home by the police, hospi-
talized in a locked unit, and perhaps even placed in four-point
restraints for purposes of the actual administration of [treatment] ."6
B. The Problem of Abuse, the Role of the Family,
and the Need for Safeguards
Concerning the issue of abuse and the related role of the family,
the legislature attempted to balance the two schools of thought. The
ultimate legislation included fewer restrictions on surrogates than
were included in the committee bill, but more than were included in
the coalition proposal.
The final bill included a provision mandating physicians who be-
lieve that the instruction of a surrogate or agent is not consistent with
"generally accepted standards of patient care" to bring the case to the
institution's ethics committee or to a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. 16  There was some debate among drafters of the two bills over
the appropriate standard for the physician "override." Three options
were considered. A physician would be required to bring the issue to
the attention of some higher authority if (1) the decision was "not
reasonable and prudent"; (2) it was inconsistent with generally ac-
cepted standards of patient care; or (3) it was made in bad faith.
Drafters of the coalition bill favored the third option as it gave the
broadest discretion to surrogates in making a decision for a patient. It
would allow a challenge to a surrogate's determination of what was in
the patient's best interest, but would require the health care provider
to show that the surrogate was making a decision that was clearly in
bad faith, e.g., in the interest of the surrogate rather than of the pa-
tient. The drafters of the committee bill rejected this option because
it seemed to require the physician to determine the intent or motive
of the surrogate. Instead, they preferred the first option, which was
consistent with the language in the then-current substituted consent
statute. 6 ' This option was objectionable to the coalition drafters be-
cause it gave the physician the option of determining what was reason-
able. John Pickering of the ABA provided further reason to reject the
standard:
161. Rich, supra note 132, at 26.
162. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-612(a) (1994).
163. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-107(f) (1990) (repealed by Maryland Acts 1993,
ch. 372, § I (effective Oct. 1, 1993)). The statute stated in part: "The substituted consent
... may not be given: . .. (3) If the health care provider knows that the individual giving
substituted consent is not acting in a reasonable or prudent manner .... " Id.,'
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The use of a "reasonable and prudent" standard as proposed
in [SB 676] would provide an unsatisfactory standard for
health care decisions. It is a much broader standard than
"accepted medical standards." A more even balancing of in-
terests would affirm that physicians may not be forced to act
against generally accepted medical standards, nor against
their consciences. The bulk of health decisions litigation
since Quinlan has at least made clear that a patient's notion
of reasonableness sometimes conflicts with physicians' no-
tions; and physicians are not the societal arbiters of reasona-
bleness and prudence."6
Ultimately, the drafters agreed upon the standard of generally ac-
cepted standards of patient care, in large part because it was a medi-
cally based standard, rather than one requiring the physician to assess
the motive or the value of a particular decision.
The legislature also adopted the approach of SB 664 in allowing
an expanded role for surrogate decisionmakers. The final statute al-
lows surrogates to make a decision to withhold or withdraw life sup-
port from a patient who is either in a terminal condition, a persistent
vegetative state, or has an "end-stage condition."165 The term "end-
stage condition" replaced the term "inevitably fatal condition" initially
used in SB 664."6 The definition of the term was also somewhat
modified.' 67
C. Role of Legislation-For the Common Person or Lawyer?; To Deter Bad
Actors or Enable the Good Ones?
The legislature opted for the less complex, shorter SB 664 as a
starting point for the legislation. Thus, legislators were persuaded by
those concerned about the length and difficulty of SB 676. However,
they were reluctant to leave many of the terms in the bill undefined
and chose instead to clone onto SB 664 several of the definitions in-
cluded in SB 676, ostensibly to provide more guidance to physicians
having to put the legislation into effect. Specific definitions added
included: substituted judgment, best interest, unavailable, and medi-
cally ineffective treatment."6
164. Letter from Pickering, supra note 92, at 3.
165. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(i) (1994).
166. See SB 664, § 5-601 (k).
167, See infra notes 196-203 (comparing MD. CODE ANN., HEAL;TH-GEN. § 5-601 (i) (1994)
with SB, 664, § 5601 (k)).
168. SeeMv. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601, 5-605 (1994).
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VI. TRANSLATING POLICIES INTO LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE; THE
ULTIMATE LEGISLATION-A WORKABLE COMPROMISE?
These policy perspectives filtered down into the actual drafting of
the bill and the ultimate statutory language. As is typically the case in
the legislative process, the approach taken is one of compromise.
Some refer to it as striking a delicate balance, and others-more
crudely-as the making of sausage. The ultimate question is whether
the compromise, although satisfying most constituents, is workable in
the real world. In this last section, I touch on some of the com-
promises made and explore some of the issues that may arise in their
implementation.
A. Advance Directive Forms
Ultimately, the legislature included in the final legislation the
forms that appeared in both SB 664 and SB 676. Thus, the statute
includes two forms: (1) a living will form; and (2) an advance direc-
tive form. 69 The living will form allows an individual to state whether
they want life-sustaining treatment, artificial nutrition and hydration,
or all available treatment if they are terminally ill or in a persistent
vegetative state.1 7' The advance directive form is in two parts. Part A,
called "Appointment of Health Care Agent," allows individuals to ap-
point health care agents to make health care decisions for them if
they lack decisionmaking capacity.1 71 Part B, called "Health Care In-
structions," allows individuals to leave instructions about their medical
care if they become incapacitated.1 72 With respect to termination of
life support, Part B allows drafters to specify whether they want life-
sustaining treatment or artificial nutrition and hydration if they have a
terminal condition, are in a persistent vegetative state, or have an end
stage condition.1 7' Alternatively, it allows them to specify that they
want all available medical treatment "in accordance with accepted
health care standards" no matter what their condition.1 74 It also al-
lows drafters to specify that they do not want medication to relieve
169. See id. § 5-603 (containing sample forms for a living will and an advance directive).
170. Id. (Form I).
171. Id. (Form II, Part A). Alternatively, the form provides that the document may go
into effect immediately upon the signature of the principal. Id.
172. Id. (Form II, Part B).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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pain and suffering if it would shorten their remaining life.1 75 An indi-
vidual may complete Part A alone, Part B alone, or both parts.1 76
Although the forms are entirely optional and an individual may
write their own document custom tailored to their own preferences,
the inclusion of the multiple forms in the statute is decidedly confus-
ing and unnecessary. The living will form is superfluous, since the
Health Care Instructions form includes all of the options provided in
the Living Will form and more. The inclusion of both forms is
unfortunate.
Although the forms allow individuals more choices and options
than under previous law, they may create other problems. Attorneys
who have had some experience with the forms, in particular the
Health Care Instructions form, assert that a number of their clients
have completed the form incorrectly. They check items that are mu-
tually exclusive.' 77 Thus, the effort to give people more choices in
their execution of these documents may mean that there are some
mistakes in their completion. As a result, health care providers who
review advance directives on a patient's admission to a hospital or
nursing home or upon enrollment in an HMO under the require-
ments of the federal Patient Self Determination Act 178 will need to
peruse these documents more diligently, checking for inconsistencies.
At a conference on the new law,1 79 the question was also raised as
to whether by completing Parts A and B of the advance directive form,
an individual would be limiting the ability of an agent to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment to those situations specified in the in-
structions. The concern might materialize if an individual had speci-
fied that she did not want life-sustaining treatment if terminally ill, in
a persistent vegetative state, or in an end stage condition, but in fact,
did not meet the criteria for any of these conditions. Instead, such an
individual might be seriously debilitated and have indicated to her
agent that if, for example, she had a cardiac arrest she would not want
to be resuscitated. If the patient had simply completed Part A of the
175. Id.
176. Id. (Form II, Parts A & B).
177. This appears to occur when an individual indicates that he or she does not want
life-sustaining treatment or artificial nutrition and hydration under any of the three scena-
rios enumerated in the form, but then initials the statement that he or she wants all avail-
able medical treatment no matter what his or her condition.
178. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206(a), 104
Stat. 1388-115 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
179. Law & Health Care Program of the University of Maryland School of Law and The
Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Implementing the Maryland Health Care Deci-
sions Act: Questions and Answers (Sept. 14, 1993).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
form-Appointment of Health Care Agent-the agent would have the
authority to authorize a DNR order. With the completion of the in-
structions, a question arises as to whether the principal only wanted
life support withheld in the three scenarios described. There is cer-
tainly a strong argument that such an interpretation is too limited.
The Appointment of a Health Care Agent form states expressly that
an agent has "full power and authority to make health care decisions
for" the principal, including the power to "[clonsent to the provision,
withholding, or withdrawal of health care, including, in appropriate
circumstances, life-sustaining procedures."180 There is no language
indicating what constitutes "appropriate circumstances" but the inter-
pretation would appear to be up to the agent. Given this plenary lan-
guage, it would be inappropriate to limit the application of the health
care instructions to those situations listed in the form.
The limitations in the form reflect the statute's restrictions re-
garding the implementation of a living will or health care instructions
when an agent has not been appointed. In those circumstances, life-
sustaining treatment may not be withheld or withdrawn from a patient
unless the patient is terminally ill, in a persistent vegetative state, or
has an end stage condition, even if the patient had clearly indicated a
desire not to receive such treatment."8 ' Such limitations are of ques-
tionable constitutional validity.'8 2
180. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (1994) (Form II, Part A).
181. The statute does not place the same limitations on the ability of an agent to with-
hold or withdraw life support as it does on a surrogate. Section 5-606(b) provides:
A health care provider may not withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures
on the basis of an advance directive where no agent has been appointed or on the
basis of the authorization of a surrogate unless:
(1) The patient's attending physician and a second physician have certified
that the patient is in a terminal condition or has an end-stage condition; or
(2) Two physicians, one of whom is a neurologist, neurosurgeon, or other
physician who has special expertise in the evaluation of cognitive functioning,
certify that the patient is in a persistent vegetative state.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(b) (1994).
182. See CANTOR, supra note 56, at 52 (stating that there is "significant doubt about the
constitutionality of statutory provisions confining implementation of advance directives to
patients 'in a terminal condition'"); see, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d
258, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), affd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (stating that when a
person is no longer competent to exercise his or her constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment, "the right still exists, but the decision must be delegated to a surrogate deci-
sionmaker"); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1989) (holding that a quadriplegic
incapable of spontaneous respiration had the right to refuse medical treatment by a venti-
lator where the only interest of the state was the general interest in preserving life and
there was no state interest in preserving the life of an innocent third party); In re Drabick,
245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denie4, 488 U.S. 958 (1989) (holding that,
"California law authorizes the conservator of an incompetent person in a vegetative state
with no hope of recovery to decide, considering medical advice and the conservatee's best
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B. Oral Advance Directives
The final legislation includes a provision allowing a competent
person to execute an oral advance directive. SB 676 limited the oral
advance directive to leaving health care instructions. SB 664 ex-
panded the oral advance directive to include the appointment of an
agent. The ultimate legislation reflected the broader authority of SB
664.
Arguments against the broader provision were based in part on
concerns about miscommunications. The Office on Aging, for exam-
ple, stated that
[u]nder the verbal directive provisions a health care agent
could be appointed to make life and death decisions without
having discussed with the patient either the appointment or
the authority granted. All the agent would know could be
communicated via "hearsay" by the witnesses. This is both
inconsistent with practice and places health care facilities in
a precarious position. s
These concerns seemed largely unfounded. In most cases, the
appointed agent would be a family member or friend who knows the
patient well. It would be the patient's responsibility to decide if the
agent would be in the best position to carry out the patient's wishes.
The agent also has the option to decline the appointment if they wish.
A similar criticism could be made of a written appointment. It is pos-
sible that one could appoint an agent in a durable power of attorney
without telling the individual of the appointment.
Other concerns with the oral advance directive provision were
based on the fact that it would make it easier for individuals to "exe-
cute" an advance directive:
The oral (or verbal) advance directive concept severely un-
dercuts the very purpose of the legislation, which is to en-
courage people thoughtfully and in dialogue with their loved
ones and physicians to consider what care they should re-
ceive when they cannot make on-the-spot decisions for them-
selves and then, with clarity and precision, to detail their
desires in this regard.
interests, that medical treatment in the form of artificial life support should be withdrawn
and the conservatee permitted a natural death."); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682
(1987) (eft banc) (holding that "[t]he right to refuse medical treatment is a personal right
sufficiently 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' to fall within the
constitutionally protected zone of privacy contemplated by the Supreme Court.").
183. Testimony of Rosalie S. Abrams, Director, Maryland Office on Aging, before the
Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm. 4 (Feb. 23, 1993).
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An oral health care directive might easily be given in an
emergency, under duress, or in other situations which afford
scarce little time for careful consideration. Health care deci-
sionmaking of this kind, especially where a decision relates
to life-preservation or to the treatment of especially vulnera-
ble patients, should be severely limited, if not also
discouraged.18 4
The incorporation of the oral appointment was considered ex-
tremely important by the drafters of the coalition bill. Whereas many
of the provisions of SB 676 required written communications, this was
perceived by the drafters of the coalition bill to be overly legalistic and
not to reflect the way that most people prefer to interact and
communicate.
In terms of implementation, the oral advance directive provision
requires that a statement be made to the patient's physician, entered
into the medical record, and witnessed by one person. s5 This is a
change from the previous Maryland law, as interpreted by the Attor-
ney General, allowing an oral advance directive to give health care
instructions, but requiring no witness.' 6 The new witness require-
ment will require a change in physician practices. There are no limi-
tations on who can be a witness, except that the witness cannot be the
person's agent.187 Thus, in most cases it is likely that the witness will
be a nurse working with a physician or a member of the patient's fam-
ily who is not the appointed agent.
C. Physician Overide
The final legislation requires a physician who determines that the
instruction of an agent or surrogate is inconsistent with generally ac-
cepted standards of patient care to report that case to the institution's
184. Facsimile fromJack Schwartz, Office of Attorney General, to Diane Hoffmann, Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law 3-4 (Mar. 23, 1993) (on file with author) (Comments of
Richard Dowling, Maryland Catholic Conference).
It is interesting that the new Uniform Health Care Decisions Act does not allow for
oral appointment of an agent. However, the model Act does allow for oral appointment of
a surrogate if made directly to a health care provider. Such oral appointment would re-
voke a previous written appointment of a health care agent. UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECI-
SIONS Acr § 5(h) (Draft for Approval 1993) [hereinafter UNIFORM AcT].
185. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(d) (1994).
186. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 162,185 (1988) ("A person need not execute a formal document
to make a choice about artificially administered sustenance. Instead, a person who is com-
petent to make medical decisions at the time of decision about insertion of a feeding tube
can decide whether to allow that procedure or not by simply telling the attending physi-
cian, who should document the decision in the patient's record.").
187. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(c)(2)(iii) (1994).
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patient care advisory committee or to a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.18" What constitutes "generally accepted standards of patient
care" is left to the judgment of the individual treating physician.
Thus, physicians have a great deal of discretion to implement this pro-
vision. Although the trigger for referral to one of these higher forums
of scrutiny is "generally accepted standards of patient care," that is not
the basis upon which the case would then be reviewed by the advisory
committee or a court. For example, in reviewing a petition filed by a
health care provider, a court must decide if the agent's or surrogate's
instruction is consistent with the patient's preferences and values or, if
that is indeterminable, with the patient's best interest." 9 It is not the
role of the committee or court to second guess the physician's deter-
mination of whether the instruction is consistent with general stan-
dards of medical practice.
A physician would have the option of following the recommenda-
tion of the patient care advisory committee, but the committee's rec-
ommendation is not binding.19 ° And, as has been the case since the
implementation of the Maryland Patient Care Advisory Committee
Act,'91 the physician is still free to make his or her own decision and
would be liable for the decision made.1 92
This physician override provision has three relatively unique as-
pects. The trigger for review-consistent with "generally accepted
standards of patient care"-appears unique to Maryland law. In other
states, physicians who do not wish to comply with the instructions of
an agent or surrogate can rely on a "conscience clause" that they do
not have to continue to treat patients if it would be in conflict with
their own morals or beliefs about what is appropriate care.' 93
Although the provision does not appear in other state statutes, the
new Uniform Act states that a health care provider or institution need
not provide "health care contrary to accepted health-care standards
applicable to that provider or institution."' 94 The second unique fea-
188. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-612(a)(1) (1994).
189. Id. § 5-612(a)(2).
190. See id. § 5-612(a)(1)(i) (stating that the health care provider may "[pletition a pa-
tient care advisory committee for advice concerning the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedure").
191. Id. §§ 19-370 to -374.
192. Id. § 19-374(f).
193. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(c)(1) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.308
(West 1993); HAW. REv. STAT. § 327D-11(b) (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/35
(Smith-Huid 1992); Ky. REv. STAT. § 311.634(2) (Baldwin 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 137-H:6,(II) (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-62(b) (West Supp. 1992); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 5409(a) (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (1991).
194. UNIFORM Acr, supra note 184, § 13(e).
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ture of the override provision is the mandatory reporting by the physi-
cian to an ethics committee or court.'9 5 No other state statute
includes such an affirmative duty on the part of physicians. The third
distinct aspect of the provision is the referral to the patient care advi-
sory committee or ethics committee.' 96 Although a few other state
statutes make reference to the use of an ethics committee, 97 these
states do not require use of the committee in this type of situation.
The Maryland requirement essentially elevates the role of ethics com-
mittees to an alternative to judicial review.
D. Surrogate Decisionmaking
The final legislative approach reflects a basic trust in the ability of
family members to make the "right" choice for their incapacitated rel-
atives. Few burdens obstruct family decisionmaking, although stan-
dards for those decisions are provided. Perhaps the most
controversial aspect of the legislation was the expansion of family au-
thority to withhold or withdraw life support from a patient lacking
decisionmaking capacity in those circumstances where the patient has
an "end-stage condition."' 98 As stated above, initially SB 664 used the
term "inevitably fatal condition."199 This term was changed during
the legislative process to "end-stage condition" and the definition was
tightened to narrow its application. The initial definition of the term
"end-stage condition" was:
an advanced, irreversible condition caused by injury, disease
or illness that:
(1) has caused severe and progressive deterioration; and
(2) to a reasonable degree of medical probability, will
cause the individual to suffer further progressive deteriora-
tion until a medically foreseeable death, whether or not life-
prolonging procedures are provided.2 ° °
The definition was amended in the House by a working group of the
Environmental Matters Committee °2 0 in response to suggestions made
195. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN., § 5-612(a) (1994).
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231(B) (1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-
103(6) (1992); NEw YORK TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE:
DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WrHoUT CAPACITY, (supp. to report and proposed legislation)
(1993).
198. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 5-606(b)(1).
199. See SB 664, § 5-601(K), 1993 Md. Regular Sess. 3.
200. SB 664, § 5-601(I) (Committee Reprint, Mar. 22, 1993).
201. Delegate Stephen Braun chaired the working group. '
1114 [VOL. 53:1064
1994] SYMPOSIUM: TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONMAKING 1115
by the Maryland Catholic Conference. The final definition reads as
follows:
"End-stage condition" means an advanced, progressive, irre-
versible condition caused by injury, disease, or illness:
(1) That has caused severe and permanent deterioration
indicated by incompetency and complete physical depen-
dency; and
(2) For which, to a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty, treatment of the irreversible condition would be med-
ically ineffective.2 "2
The changes are significant. The inclusion of the term "progressive"
was an effort to distinguish the condition from conditions of severe
cognitive impairment and other physical disabilities that are not pro-
gressive but constant, such as quadriplegia accompanied by brain
damage; severe mental retardation; brain damage and physical inca-
pacities due to a stroke. The concern was that individuals in these last
categories who are severely disabled not be denied life support solely
because of their disability.2 3 However, severely disabled individuals
who also have a progressive condition that will lead to continued de-
cline and ultimately death would fit within the category.
The other important amendment was the inclusion of the term
"complete" before "physical dependency." An Opinion of the Attor-
ney General interpreting the term "end-state condition" emphasizes
this feature of the definition:
According to the Senate Floor Report on House Bill 1243,
the Senate's intent in insisting on the language "complete
physical dependency" was "to emphasize that the category of
'end-stage condition' only applies to patients who have suf-
fered severe and permanent generalized infirmity from an
untreatable irreversible condition."
Thus, on the one hand, a patient with Alzheimer's dis-
ease who needs help with some aspects of personal care
20 4
202. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(i) (1994) (emphasis added).
203. This concern was consistent with another provision of the statute, which prohibited
a surrogate from making a decision to withhold or withdraw life support on "either a pa-
tient's preexisting [sic], long-term mental or physical disability, or a patient's economic
disadvantage." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c) (3) (1994).
2042."Personal care" means "a service that an individual normally would perform per-
sonally, but for which the individual needs help from another because of advanced age,
infirmity, or physical or mental limitation." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-301 (k)(1)
(Supp. 1993). "Personal care" includes: "(i) Help in walking; (ii) Help in getting in and
out of bed; (iii) Help in bathing; (iv) Help in dressing; (v) Help in feeding; and (vi) Gen-
eral supervision and help in daily living." Id. § 19-301 (k) (2) (Supp. 1993).
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but who is able to engage in other activities independently is
not in an "end-stage condition." On the other hand, an
Alzheimer's disease patient who has deteriorated to the
point where the patient needs help in all aspects of personal
care might be determined to be in an "end-stage condition."
A representative of the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of
Maryland well summarized the legislative objective underly-
ing this language:
"With regard to the 'end-stage condition' defini-
tion, the use of 'complete' to modify 'physical de-
pendency' is evidently aimed at describing victims
of Alzheimer's Disease and other conditions, who
are bed-ridden and suffering from a generalized in-
firmity that will not improve. A physician who is
asked to evaluate whether a patient has exper-
ienced 'complete physical dependency' would look
to the range of ordinary physical abilities and assess
the patient's ability to conduct them
independently."2 o5
The interpretation makes it clear that the condition will only apply to
those who cannot perform any of the generally accepted list of activi-
ties of daily living without assistance, such as bathing, dressing, eating,
walking, toileting.
The second part of the amended definition, however, is some-
what confusing. It states that treatment of the condition must be
"medically ineffective."206 The definition of "medically ineffective" in
the statute is treatment that, "to a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty," will neither "[p]revent or reduce the deterioration of the
health of an individual" nor "prevent the impending death of an indi-
vidual."20 7 The Attorney General's Opinion describing "end-stage
condition" simply states that "[i] f a treatment would likely 'prevent or
reduce the deterioration' in the patient's health that the condition
would otherwise cause, then the patient is not in an 'end-stage condi-
tion.' . . . But if the underlying condition is, in the phrase of the
Senate Floor Report, 'untreatable,' the last element of the definition
will have been met."20 What the Opinion does not do is state how the
last part of the definition of "medically ineffective treatment," "that
205. 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 1155-56 (1993) [Opinion No. 93-019 (June 1, 1993)] (citations
omitted).
206. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(i) (2) (1994).
207. Id. § 5-601 (n).
208. 78 Op. Att'y Gen. at 1156.
1116 [VOL. 53:1064
1994] SYMPosIuM: TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONMAKING 1117
which neither prevents deterioration of health or impending death,"
would be applied to the end stage condition.
In a subsequent letter interpreting the Health Care Decisions
Act, the Chief Counsel of Opinions & Advice with the Office of the
Attorney General states that the requirement that treatment be medi-
cally ineffective refers to the "'irreversible condition' itself, not some
emergent medical problem," and furthermore that the portion of the
definition regarding prevention of impending death, is only pertinent
when an individual "faces impending death," and that individuals with
an end stage condition, by definition, cannot be facing death. 2°9
Thus, this prong of the definition of medically ineffective treatment is
not relevant to the definition of end stage condition.
In spite of the concerns of a few that the end stage condition
provision "goes too far" in allowing surrogates to make decisions to
terminate life support, it is consistent with the trends in state law gen-
erally. In Virginia2 t0 and the District of Columbia,21' there are no
limitations tied to the patient's condition on the ability of a surrogate
to make a decision to terminate life support for an incapacitated fam-
ily member. The surrogate must simply act based on the patient's
preferences and values or best interests. 212 The new Uniform Health
Care Decisions Act, similarly, does not limit surrogate decisionmaking
to narrow categories of the patient's condition. 21 3 Also, many other
states have modified the definition of "terminal condition" in their
advance directive and surrogate decisionmaking statutes so that it is
much broader.214 In some jurisdictions, for example, the definition
209. Letter from Jack Schwartz, Chief Counsel, Opinions & Advice, Office of Attorney
General, to Patricia Kelly, Director, Maryland Catholic Conference 2 (Aug. 11, 1993) (on
file with author). The letter further states that the
"end-stage condition" elements of the Act matter only when a patient is not facing
impending death. If the patient were facing impending death, the patient would
be in a "terminal condition," .... To read an "impending death" requirement
into the definition [of] "end-stage condition" would make the Act's provisions
allowing for advance directives and surrogate decision-making concerning end-
stage condition utterly meaningless, adding nothing that could not be done
under the rubric of "terminal condition."
Id. The letter concludes that this could not have been the intent of the legislature given
that the "policy argument over end-stage condition was waged with great intensity precisely
because everyone recognized that the category extended beyond those who were on the
verge of death." Id.
210. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie Supp. 1993).
211. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2201 to -2213 (1989).
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2206(c)
(1989).
213. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 184, § 5(f).
214. See supra note 56.
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of "terminal condition" can be interpreted to include advanced
Alzheimer's Disease. 15 Thus, the trend seems to be away from tight
constraints on family decisionmaking. Moreover, some authors are
critical of the general effort to limit surrogate decisionmaking to cate-
gories such as terminal condition and PVS, arguing that these catego-
ries are arbitrary and not meaningful and that the focus should be on
making decisions that are consistent with what the patient would have
wanted or are in the patient's best interest.2" 6
1. Priority of Surrogates/Close Friend. -The new Maryland law sets
forth a list of individuals in order of priority who may make health
care decisions for an incapacitated patient. The list includes:
(i) A guardian for the patient, if one has been
appointed;
(ii) The patient's spouse;
(iii) An adult child of the patient;
(iv) A parent of the patient;
(v) An adult brother or sister of the patient; or
(vi) A friend or other relative of the patient who meets
[certain requirements].27
Health care providers must consult these individuals in order of prior-
ity. 18 A provider may consult someone lower on the list only if every-
one in the higher categories is unavailable.219
215. See, e.g., AIasA STAT. § 18.12.100(7) (1991); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-103(10)
(Supp. 1992); Kv. REv. STAT. § 311.624(8) (Baldwin 1991); MIN. STAT. § 145B.02 (Supp.
1993); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-113 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-3402(13) (Supp. 1992);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34-12D-1(8) (Supp. 1993); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 672.002(9) (West 1992).
216. See, e.g., GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 3, at 58, n.82 ("(t] here is... an
emerging medical/ethical consensus that the use of terms such as 'terminal illness,' 'termi-
nal condition,' and 'imminently dying' often create more confusion than clarity in LSMT
decisions, and that regardless of the patient's condition, the overriding concerns for the
health care provider in the forgoing of LSMT are: (1) respecting patient autonomy (self
determination), and (2) improving patient well being (the weighing of benefits and bur-
dens of one plan of care in comparison with alternatives)").
217. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a)(2) (1994).
218. Id. § 5-605(a)(2) (1994).
219. Id. "Unavailable" is defined as
(i) After reasonable inquiry, a health care provider is unaware of the exist-
ence of a surrogate decision maker;
(ii) After reasonable inquiry, a health care provider cannot ascertain the
whereabouts of a surrogate decision maker;
(iii) A surrogate decision maker has not responded in a timely manner, tak-
ing into account the health care needs of the individual, to a writtei or .oral
message from a health care provider;
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An innovation of the final law is the provision allowing a "close
friend" to act as surrogate if the patient has no close family mem-
bers.220 To serve as a surrogate, someone in this category must com-
plete an affidavit to the patient's attending physician stating: "1. That
the person is a relative or close friend of the patient; and 2. Specific
facts and circumstances demonstrating that the person has main-
tained regular contact with the patient sufficient to be familiar with
the patient's activities, health, and personal beliefs."221 The provision
was designed to allow individuals other than close family to make
medical treatment decisions for incapacitated patients, but to ensure
that such individuals actually know the patient well and would be in a
position to provide an indication of the patient's preferences regard-
ing medical treatment. Although this provision will undoubtedly be
useful in a number of situations where close family members are not
available, there are no standards for determining whether the close
friend is "close enough." This determination is, in effect, left to the
health care providers and the institution. In most cases, there will not
be a question of qualifications, but certainly cases will arise where the
"close friend" had known the patient at an earlier period in their lives,
but had not been in touch with the patient for several years. Will this
be sufficient contact? Because the statute does not provide guidance
here, health care institutions may want to draft guidelines for consid-
eration in determining the appropriateness of a close friend to act as
surrogate or have the institution's patient care advisory committee re-
view affidavits that are problematic on their face.
2. Standards for Surrogate Decisionmaking.-As stated above, the
legislation reflects the somewhat legalistic approach of defining all
terms and providing express standards for decisionmaking.22 2 The
law provides that surrogates must first base a decision on the wishes of
the patient and sets forth expressly what factors the surrogate shall
consider in making that determination.22 These factors include the
patient's:
(iv) A surrogate decision maker is incapacitated; or
(v) A surrogate decision maker is unwilling to make decisions concerning
health care for the individual.
Id.
220. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a)(2)(vi) (1994); see also Amiz. REv. STAT.
ANN.,§ -3231(A)(6) (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(1)(g) (West 1992); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/25 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
221. MP. ,CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (3) (iii) (1994).
22,2, See id. §§ 5-601, -605.
223. Id. § 5-605(c).
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(i) Current diagnosis and prognosis with and without
the treatment at issue;
(ii) Expressed preferences regarding the provision of,
or the withholding or withdrawal of, the specific treatment at
issue or of similar treatments;
(iii) Relevant religious and moral beliefs and personal
values;
(iv) Behavior, attitudes, and past conduct with respect
to the treatment at issue and medical treatment generally;
(v) Reactions to the provision of, or the withholding or
withdrawal of, a similar treatment for another individual;
and
(vi) Expressed concerns about the effect on the family
or intimate friends of the patient if a treatment were pro-
vided, withheld, or withdrawn. 22
4
If the patient's wishes are unknown or unclear, the surrogate is to
make a decision based on the patient's best interest.225 "Best interest"
means that
the benefits to the individual resulting from a treatment out-
weigh the burdens to the individual resulting from that treat-
ment, taking into account:
(1) The effect of the treatment on the physical, emo-
tional, and cognitive functions of the individual;
(2) The degree of physical pain or discomfort caused to
the individual by the treatment, or the withholding or with-
drawal of the treatment;
(3) The degree to which the individual's medical condi-
tion, the treatment, or the withholding or withdrawal of
treatment result in a severe and continuing impairment of
the dignity of the individual by subjecting the individual to a
condition of extreme humiliation and dependency;
(4) The effect of the treatment on the life expectancy of
the individual;
(5) The prognosis of the individual for recovery, with
and without the treatment;
(6) The risks, side effects, and benefits of the treatment
or the withholding or withdrawal of the treatment; and
(7) The religious beliefs and basic values of the individ-
ual receiving treatment, to the extent these may assist the
decision maker in determining best interest.226
224. Id. § 5-605(c)(2).
225. Id. § 5-605(c).
226. Id. § 5-601(e).
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Other states' health care decisionmaking statutes generally lack such
elaborate definitions. Most require that surrogates and agents make
decisions that are consistent with the patient's wishes and values or
best interests, but go no further than that.2 27 The question is whether
such definitions will be helpful or confining. Although definitions in
general have a tendency to be confining, these definitions are quite
expansive when compared to their treatment in judicial opinions and
in the literature. 28 It is more likely that they will force surrogates and
health care providers to explore all possible evidence of the patient's
intent as well as all aspects of his or her best interest.
One noteworthy aspect of the definition of "best interest" is the
provision allowing consideration of the patient's religious beliefs and
basic values. 229 This provision changes the best interest standard from
a purely objective one to at least a "limited-objective" test, allowing
consideration of these values in conjunction with objective medical
criteria.23 °
A second noteworthy aspect of the standards and their applica-
tion is that surrogates are not required to meet a "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" test. Although this is the standard for judicial
decisionmaking,231 it is not applied in the context of surrogate deci-
sionmaking outside of court. Thus, surrogates need not articulate
precise statements by the patient with regard to her preferences for
artificial nutrition and hydration or other types of life support. They
may, instead, rely on their intuitive knowledge of what the patient
would want in the circumstances presented.
3. Disputes Among Surrogates.--Although the law sets forth a pri-
ority listing of individuals who have surrogate decisionmaking author-
227. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-707(d) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT.
§ 145B.06 (Supp. 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:2 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2986(A) (Michie Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.20(5) (West Supp. 1993); UNI-
FORM ACr, supra note 184, § 5(f).
228. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that under a good faith standard, a conservator must consider information rele-
vant to the conservatee's best interest); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz.
1987) ("Under the best interest standard, the surrogate decisionmaker assesses what medi-
cal treatment would be in the patient's best interest as determined by such objective crite-
ria as relief from suffering, preservation or restoration of functioning, and quality."). See
generallyJeffrey Delaney, Comment, Specific Intent, Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: A
Nationwide Analysis of an Individual's Right to Die, 11 PACE L. REv. 565 (1991).
229. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(e)(7) (1994).
230. See Pollack, supra note 77, at 518-25 (reviewing the continuum of substitute judg-
ment and best interest tests applied by courts).
231. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-712(b) (Supp. 1993).
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ity,2 32 disputes are still possible. When the dispute is between
individuals of the same rank, e.g., adult children, parents or adult sib-
lings, the law provides a unique dispute resolution process-referral
to the institution's patient care advisory committee. 3 The commit-
tee then may recommend a course of action to the physician. 234 The
physician may act in accordance with the recommendation of the
committee without fear of liability for any claim based on lack of
consent.
235
This provision is also unique among state health care decision
statutes. Many statutes simply provide that a health care provider may
act based on the position of the majority of individuals within the
group.23 6 Because of Maryland's requirement that all institutions
have a patient care advisory committee,23 7 the legislature was able to
utilize that mechanism for dispute resolution. Although the process
may be preferable to a "majority rule," it does raise some issues for
ethics and advisory committees and their ability to handle these types
of disagreements. The law places increasing authority and responsi-
bility on these committees without concurrent resources or standards
for committee process.238 These new responsibilities should make
committees reflect on their capabilities and processes and prepare for
their new role. The new responsibilities argue for better education of
committee members, more thorough procedures, and more attention
to process by these committees.
In terms of disputes among others on the list, someone lower on
the surrogate list who disagrees with the authorized surrogate has the
burden of taking the case to court and showing, by a preponderance
232. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (2) (1994).
233. Id. § 5-605(b).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5(A)(3) (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-322(b)(iv) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(A) (Michie Supp. 1993). But see CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(4) (a) (Supp. 1993) (stating that it is the responsibility of inter-
ested persons, as defined in the statute, to make reasonable efforts to reach consensus as to
who should make medical treatment decisions on behalf of the patient. If, however, an
interested person disagrees with the decision of the proxy decisionmaker, or if consensus
cannot be reached as to who the proxy decisionmaker should be, any interested person
may seek guardianship of the patient). .
237. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 19-370 to -374 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
238. Ethics committees generally have been criticized for their lack of due process type
protections. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees In Health Care Intitutions-
Is It Time?, 50 MD. L. REv. 746 (1991); Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process,
Nesting Rights in a Community of Caing, 50 MD. L. REv. 798 (1991).
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of the evidence, that the surrogate's instructions were not lawfully au-
thorized by the statute or other state or federal law.239
E. Safeguards
Although not taking the route of SB 6 76-incorporating numer-
ous, burdensome obstacles to surrogate decisionmaking-the law
does include several safeguards to protect against surrogates who may
be acting out of self-interest. In addition to the provision that re-
quires physicians to bring a case to the patient care advisory commit-
tee or court if it is inconsistent with generally accepted standards of
patient care,24° surrogates who do not act in good faith will lose their
immunity from criminal and civil liability.241 Although "good faith" is
not defined, this provision is an effort to get at those cases where the
surrogate is clearly motivated by self-interest or interests other than
the welfare of the patient. Few such cases have surfaced in the
courts.2 4 2
F. Medically Ineffective Treatment
The final legislation includes a provision that physicians need not
provide care that is "medically ineffective." 24 The concept has long
been recognized in medical practice and law that a physician need not
offer therapy to a patient that the physician determines will not be
effective. Nor does the statute require a physician to obtain informed
consent from the patient in this decision. For example, a physician
need not offer chemotherapy to a patient when the physician believes
the therapy would not be effective in treating her cancer, nor must he
offer the option of surgery if it is not deemed to be of any benefit.
Although this general principle has long been recognized, problems
have arisen in the area of cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and
the ability of physicians to write Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders
without patient consent. The literature has framed the debate as one
239. Mn. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-612(b) (1994). This subsection is in contrast to
the provisions of Maryland's former substituted consent statute where substituted consent
could not be given if the health care provider was informed in writing that one or more of
the persons listed in the statute opposed the decision of the surrogate. MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 20-107(f) (4) (1990).
240. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-612(a) (1994).
241. Id. § 5-609(c).
242. An exception is the oft-cited case of In re Guardianship of Stone, No. 90-5867 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1991) (considering a dispute between second wife of patient and patient's son over
termination of life support in which the patient's son said that his step-mother wanted to
prolong Mr. Stone's life so that she would gain more monies under an ante-nuptial
agreement).
243. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(b) (1994).
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of medical futility.24 4 While there is some consensus that CPR is medi-
cally futile for some categories of patients, the difficulty has come in
defining those categories. In the final legislation, the Maryland legis-
lature took the bold step of attempting to define "medically ineffective
treatment." Treatment is considered "medically ineffective" if "to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty," it will not "(1) [p]revent or
reduce the deterioration of the health of an individual; or (2)
[p]revent the impending death of an individual."245 To ensure that
the definition is met, two physicians must certify that the treatment
meets the criteria before life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or
withdrawn.2 4 6 Whether the definition will help or hinder medical
providers is uncertain. The medical community appeared somewhat
split over the incorporation of the definition into the bill. The state
Medical and Chirurgical Faculty supported the inclusion of the defini-
tion in order to guide physicians who were increasingly troubled by
the situation where a family member wants everything done for the
patient including CPR if the patient suffers cardiac arrest, but the phy-
sician believes such intervention is useless and perhaps even cruel. 247
Other physicians seemed to want more discretion in defining the term
in their own way.
The term "medically ineffective" is narrowly defined to reflect the
concept of physiologic futility-the inability of the proposed treat-
ment to achieve the generally accepted goals of that treatment.248 In
the case of CPR, "physiologic futility" would mean the inability of CPR
to restore cardio-pulmonary functioning. The definition does not
cover the continuation of artificial nutrition and hydration to a pa-
tient in a persistent vegetative state,249 as the nutrition and hydration
would prevent the individual's deterioration and impending death.250
244. See, e.g., CLAIRE C. OBADE, PATIENT CARE DECISION-MAKING: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR
PROVIDERS § 10.01 et seq. (1993); Steven H. Miles, Medical Futility, 20 LAw, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 310 (1992); Edward R. Grant, Medical Futility: Legal and Ethical Aspects, 20 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 330 (1992); Stuart J. Youngner, Futility in Context, 264 JAMA 1295 (1990)
(editorial).
245. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(n) (1994).
246. Id. § 5-611(b)(2)(i).
247. See Letter from Louis Breschi, M.D., Chair, Committee on Professional Ethics, to
Jose Martinez, M.D., Chair, Legislative Committee 4 (Feb. 3, 1993) (on file with author).
248. OBADE, supra note 244, at § 10.01; see also Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility
and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264JAMA 1276 (1990); HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES, Supra
note 81, at 32.
249. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Wanglie, No. PK-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Henne-
pin Co.,July 1991).
250. Although an individual in a PVS is not terminally ill and death is not impending, if
-denied artificial nutrition and hydration, the patient would be expected to die within a
very short period of time. The second prong of the definition of "medically ineffective
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An effort to expand the definition to include this type of situation
would allow the physician, as opposed to the patient or surrogate, to
make a decision regarding the quality of life of the patient and the
value of keeping that individual alive.
G. Transfer Provision
The provision regarding medically ineffective treatment was
somewhat weakened by an amendment to the bill regarding patient
transfers. If a patient, agent, or surrogate requests that everything be
done for the patient, including CPR, the physician must inform the
agent or surrogate of the option to transfer the patient to another
provider and must assist in that process.21 Furthermore, pending the
transfer, the provider must comply with the instruction of the patient
or the agent or surrogate if failure to comply with the instruction
would likely result in the death of the individual. 252 A practical prob-
lem may arise in the implementation of this provision if the institution
cannot find another physician or institution that is willing to receive
the transfer. A question arises regarding how long the institution
must continue to provide treatment under these circumstances. The
unavailability of a provider willing to take the case would seem to con-
firm that the proposed treatment is medically ineffective. There are,
however, no guidelines for institutions under these circumstances,
and most institutions, fearing liability, will opt for the conservative
route of continuing to treat the patient. This lack of guidance se-
verely undercuts the ability of a provider or institution to make a deci-
sion based on medical ineffectiveness.253
H. Guardianship
Regarding the guardianship provisions of the new law, the legisla-
ture again chose a middle course somewhat more restrictive than that
proposed in SB 664, but less restrictive than that proposed by drafters
treatment," however, may not be relevant in all cases. For example, would a fetal tissue
transplant be medically effective in the treatment of someone with Alzheimer's disease?
Probably not since this form of treatment has not been proven effective in reducing the
deterioration of the health of an individual with Alzheimer's disease and death is not
impending.
251. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613(a) (1994).
252. Id. § 5-613(a)(3).
253. Since the implementation of the law, the usefulness of the medically ineffective
treatment provision has been called into question. The provision was modeled after a
similar section in Virginia's Health Care Decision Act. In February 1994, the Fourth Cir-
cuit ruled that, in certain circumstances, this aspect of the Virginia law is pre-empted by
the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). In re Baby K, 16
F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
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of the committee bill.25 4 The initial drafts of SB 664 authorized the
guardian to make a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment without court authorization if the patient had made an ad-
vance directive instructing that life-sustaining procedures be withheld
under the circumstances or if the guardian is the patient's spouse,
adult child, parent, or adult brother or sister.255 The final legislation
allows a judge to "authorize a guardian to make a decision regarding
medical procedures that involve a substantial risk to life without fur-
ther court authorization," if the patient has executed an advance di-
rective specifying that the patient did not want life support under the
circumstances presented or if the guardian was also the patient's
spouse, adult child, parent, or adult brother or sister.25
6
Given the path chosen by the legislature, an attorney represent-
ing an allegedly disabled individual in a guardianship hearing will
need to petition the court to include a provision in the order authoriz-
ing the guardian to make decisions involving the withholding or with-
drawal of life support without further court approval.
I. Court Standards
Finally, the legislation set standards and procedures for judges in
hearing cases involving the termination of life support. Unlike the
limitations on surrogates, judges are not restricted to approving the
withholding or withdrawal of life support when patients are in a termi-
nal or end stage condition or in a PVS. The legislation provides that
"[t] he court may approve a request for the withholding or withdrawal
of a life-sustaining procedure from a disabled person on the basis of a
substituted judgment" and that the court may make such a determina-
tion "only on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the dis-
abled person would, if competent, decide to withhold or withdraw a
life-sustaining procedure under the circumstances." 257 This height-
ened evidentiary standard was consistent with that proposed by the
drafters of the committee bill,258 as well as the recent Court of Ap-
peals decision in Mack v. Mack,2159 and numerous other state court
opinions. 6 ° Yet many other states have rejected the clear and con-
254. Compare SB 676, §§ 13-601 to -713 with SB 664, §§ 13-707 to -708.
255. See SB 664, § 13-708(2).
256. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(2) (Supp. 1993).
257. Id. § 13-712.
258. See SB 676, § 13-712(B).
259. 329 Md. 188, 208, 618 A.2d 744, 754 (1993).
260. See, e.g., McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 605 (Conn. -1989);
In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1989), ert. question
answered, approved, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d .1194,
1126 [VOL. 53:1064
1994] SyMposiuM: TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONMAKING 1127
vincing evidence test26' and numerous legal scholars have questioned
its use in these cases.26 2 Despite the controversy over the use of this
evidentiary standard, there is considerable authority justifying its
use.263 What is more unusual and troubling, however, is the use of the
clear and convincing evidentiary standard in the best interest test of
the Health Care Decisions Act. The law provides that
[i]f the court is unable to make a substituted judgment ....
the court may approve a request for the withholding or with-
drawal of a life-sustaining procedure from the [patient] if
the court determines, on the basis of clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the withholding or withdrawal is in the best inter-
est of the [patient] .264
The use of the clear and convincing evidence test is somewhat per-
plexing in this context. As it is stated, it is distinct from a standard
that requires that the benefits of the proposed treatment or course of
action clearly outweigh the burdens of the treatment, i.e., that there
be significantly more evidence of benefit than of burden. Rather, the
standard could conceivably be met even if there were only slightly
more evidence of benefit than burden, as long as the evidence was
clear and persuasive. Moreover, the best interest test is not one that
readily lends itself to the quantification of a clear and convincing evi-
dence standard.265
1202 (IlI. 1990); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (I11. 1989); In re Swan, 569
A.2d 1202, 1206 (Me. 1990) (per curiam); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953 (Me. 1987);
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 425 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), affd sub nor. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 426
N.E.2d 809, 815 (Ohio Misc. 1980); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 425 (N.J. 1987); In re
O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988); Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 545 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980).
261. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In re
Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1271 (Mass.), cert. denied, Doe v. Gross, 112 S. Ct.
1512' (1992).
262. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 77, at 390-91 (arguing that such a high evidentiary
standard is unrealistic and inconsistent with the way in which individuals express them-
selves). Other scholars believe the evidentiary standard has been used not to advance the
interests of patients, but rather to advance those of the state. See, e.g., Payton, supra note
128, at 613-15.
263. See supra note 260.
264. MD. CODE AmN., EsT. & TRusTs § 13-713 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
265., For'example, in the context of termination of life support, different individuals
may define what constitutes a benefit and what constitutes a burden very differently. For
some,.h benefit may be death; for others, death may be the ultimate burden.
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j. Application of Best Interest to Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State
Although the final legislation does not prohibit the application of
a best interest test to someone in a PVS, it leaves open the question of
how the test would be applied to someone in that condition. The law
sets forth seven criteria that an agent, surrogate, or judge must con-
sider in making a best interest assessment/determination regarding
the withholding or withdrawal of life support for an incapacitated
patient.26
6
Certain of the criteria will not be relevant to someone in a PVS,
including that relating to the effect of the treatment on the physical,
emotional, and cognitive functions of the patient or that regarding
the degree of physical pain or discomfort caused to the patient by
maintenance, withholding or withdrawal of treatment. 267 Given the
patient's physical condition, medical treatment will not affect the
emotional and cognitive functioning of a patient in a PVS. Further-
more, an individual in a PVS cannot experience pain. With respect to
the effect on prognosis, 268 the patient will not recover from the PVS
no matter what type of treatment is given. The fourth criterion, the
effect of the treatment on the life expectancy of the individual,269
begs the question of whether prolonging the life of a patient with no
ability to experience life is a good thing. Similarly, consideration of
criterion number six, pertaining to the "risks, side effects, and benefits
of the treatment or the withholding or withdrawal of the treat-
ment,"270 leaves open the question of what constitutes a risk to some-
one in a PVS. For example, is risk of death a good or a bad result?
Results obtained by applying the third criterion to a PVS patient,
"[t]he degree to which the individual's medical condition, the treat-
ment, or the withholding or withdrawal of treatment result in a severe
and continuing impairment of the dignity of the individual by subject-
ing the individual to a condition of extreme humiliation and depen-
266. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(e) (1994); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS
§ 13-711(b) (Supp. 1993).
267. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (e) (1),(2) (1994); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 13-711(b)(1),(2) (Supp. 1993).
268. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(e)(5) (1994) (providing that the deci-
sionmaker consider the prognosis for recovery with and without the treatment); MD. CODE
ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-711(b)(5) (Supp. 1993).
269. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (e) (4) (1994); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRuSTS
§ 13-711 (b) (4) (Supp. 1993).
270. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (e) (6) (1994); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS
§ 13-711 (b) (6) (Supp. 1993).
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dency,"271 depends on the perspective taken. An individual in a PVS
cannot experience humiliation or the indignity of extreme depen-
dency. However, if the individual is viewed more holistically-taking
into account his prior life and values, then it could more easily be
argued that a treatment decision does subject the patient to humilia-
tion or indignity. The seventh provision concerning the religious be-
liefs and basic values of the patient272 allows some extrapolation from
the patient's earlier life when competent to the patient's existence in
a PVS. A broader spectrum of values may be considered when deter-
mining best interest than when determining a patient's wishes under a
substituted judgment test.273 These values may include the patient's
views about dependency, confinement, medical treatment, illness, and
risk-taking.
The factors specified in the statute provide no basis as to how
they should be weighed or factored in deciding the patient's best in-
terest. Despite the General Assembly's effort to constrain deci-
sionmakers by defining the parameters of the decision, the definition
leaves considerable discretion to those with decisionmaking authority.
Given this discretion, the law's definition of "best interest" could allow
for a decision to withhold or withdraw life support from someone in a
PVS.
CONCLUSION
The title of this Article, "The Maryland Health Care Decisions
Act: Achieving the Right Balance?" implies that there is a "right" bal-
ance in drafting health care decisionmaking legislation. Unfortu-
nately, in a pluralistic society with few universally agreed-upon moral
precepts, there is no ethical yardstick by which to measure "rightness"
regarding these issues.2 74 In the legislative arena, the measure of
"rightness" is most often measured by process and satisfaction. In
terms of process, the Maryland legislature heard many voices on these
issues and made a valiant effort to accommodate them. This law is
clearly a step forward for Maryland citizens that will allow them a
greater role in decisionmaking regarding their medical treatment.
Citizens confronted with a situation similar to that of Nicci Bojanowski
271. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (e) (3) (1994); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§ 13-711(b)(3) (Supp. 1993).
272. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (e) (7) (1994); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRusTS
§ 13-711 (b) (7) (Supp. 1993).
273. Usually in the latter situation involving substituted judgment, the question focuses
on a particular treatment and a patient's views regarding that treatment.
274. See, e.g., CANTOR, supra note 56, at 98.
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and her family will no longer have to go to court to terminate life
support for a loved one.
Despite these advances, the passage of this legislation is only one
step in the process of assuring that patients will receive the type of
treatment they desire at the end of their lives. The implementation of
this new law requires that all citizens be educated about their rights
and responsibilities under it. Consumers of health care must be made
aware of the value of completing advance directives and how to exe-
cute them. Health care providers must understand their role under
the new law and the rights of their patients and their patients' family
members to make health care treatment decisions. Educating health
care providers, in particular physicians, about new legal developments
in treating patients may prove difficult. Some have attributed it to
their general disdain for the law and desire for professional auton-
omy.275 In describing a proposed law in New York that is similar to
the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act, Jonathan Moreno asserted
that "even measures intended to be 'physician-friendly' are greeted by
many as another intrusion into clinical reality by amateurs far from
the front, along with such objects of scorn as peer review mechanisms
and malpractice suits."2 76 While the new law undoubtedly reduces
physician discretion in some cases, it expands it in others. Moveover,
we have reached a point now in the practice of modern medicine
where physicians cannot continue to call all the shots. New technolo-
gies and procedures raise issues that involve us all as members of a
larger community. The initial or continued use of these technologies
by the medical profession requires a scrutiny and debate beyond the
confines of the medical community. The evolution of the Health
Care Decisions Act is an illustration of how such a debate can begin to
take place.
275. SeeJonathan D. Moreno, Who's to Choose? Surrogate Decisionmaking in New York State,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 11.
276. Id.
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